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Judicial Power & Civil Rights Reconsidered
David E. Bernstein and Ilya Somin
Abstract
Michael Klarman’s “From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and
the Struggle for Racial Equality” is an important contribution to the scholarly lit-
erature on both the history of the civil rights struggle and judicial power more gen-
erally. Klarman argues that for much of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
was very reluctant to rule in favor of African American civil rights claimants, and
had little impact when it did.
Klarman is right to reject traditional accounts that greatly exaggerated the Supreme
Court’s willingness and ability to protect minorities. However, he overstates his
case. The Court’s views on the proper scope of African Americans’ rights peri-
odically diverged from that of the political branches of government. The Justices’
relative insulation from political pressure; their membership in a different genera-
tional cohort than the median voter; the idiosyncrasies of presidential selection of
Justices; and the Justices’ nationalist inclinations all help explain this result.
Moreover, in at least three types of situations, judicial invalidation of Jim Crow
legislation significantly aided African Americans: (1) when such legislation had
solved collective action problems among racist whites; (2) when legislation had
enabled white actors to externalize the costs of Jim Crow onto society as a whole;
and (3) when laws lowered the overall costs of maintaining Jim Crow.
This Review supports these conclusions by closely examining relevant Supreme
Court decisions, especially Progressive Era cases and Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.
BERNSTEIN-SOMIN DRAFT FOR OFFICER PROOF 11/5/2004 3:32 PM 
 
 
101 
 
 
Book Review 
 
Judicial Power and Civil Rights Reconsidered 
David E. Bernstein† and Ilya Somin†† 
 
From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for 
Racial Equality. By Michael J. Klarman.∗ New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004. Pp. 655. $35.00. 
INTRODUCTION 
 No line of cases enhanced the prestige of the Supreme Court as much 
as Brown v. Board of Education1 and other decisions vindicating the rights 
of African Americans. Initially, Brown was criticized by some prominent 
liberal legal scholars for overruling the democratic process in a way 
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reminiscent of hated Lochner-era jurisprudence.2 Later, once a liberal 
consensus favoring Brown coalesced, and Brown came to be seen by 
liberals as a courageous, important, and correct decision on behalf of civil 
rights, the anti-Brown banner was raised, if at all, only by some 
conservatives opposed to what they perceived as the Court’s illegitimate 
judicial activism.3 
In recent years, however, liberal adulation of Brown has come under 
severe criticism from revisionist scholars associated with the political left. 
This time, the charge is not that Brown was wrongly decided or otherwise 
improper as a matter of constitutional law. Rather, Brown revisionists argue 
that both scholars and the popular media have vastly exaggerated the 
importance of Brown to the African-American freedom struggle. Moreover, 
the revisionists suggest that Brown, by focusing the energies of liberal 
advocates of social change on what the revisionists see as largely 
unproductive litigation, has actually retarded the progressive agenda.4 
Michael J. Klarman’s From Jim Crow to Civil Rights is an impressive 
addition to the revisionist literature.5 Klarman pays close attention to the 
social and political context of civil rights litigation and makes a powerful 
 
2. See Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950’s, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 564 
(1988) (explaining that for many 1950s liberal academics, “opposition to Lochner demanded 
opposition to Brown as a matter of integrity and principle”). Prominent liberal critiques of Brown 
included LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958), and Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral 
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). The Court was not completely 
oblivious to such criticism and sometimes explicitly distinguished its decisions in race cases from 
Lochner. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (“We agree, of 
course, with Mr. Justice Holmes that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ‘does 
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.’” (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 
(1905))). 
  The articles critical of Brown generated a pro-Brown backlash. See, e.g., Charles L. 
Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960); Owen M. Fiss, 
Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564 
(1965); Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor 
Wechsler, 108 U. PENN. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
3. See, e.g., PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE M. STRATTON, THE NEW COLOR LINE 
(1995). Perhaps the lone liberal holdout on Brown was quirky originalist Raoul Berger. See 
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (1977) (arguing that Brown was wrongly decided because it was contrary to the 
original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
4. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE 
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004) (alleging that Brown failed to improve 
education for African Americans and suggesting that the Court might have done better to enforce 
the pre-Brown “separate but equal” regime more rigorously); CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL 
DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION (2004) (asserting that Brown failed to effectively promote integration); GERALD N. 
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 9-169 (1991) 
(arguing that Brown did nothing to advance civil rights and may even have retarded progress by 
stimulating a Southern white backlash and by diverting black activists away from political action 
that would have been more effective than litigation). 
5. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004). 
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argument that defenders of the Supreme Court vastly overstate both its 
inclination and its ability to protect the rights of politically weak racial 
minorities.6 From Jim Crow to Civil Rights is the definitive study of the 
Supreme Court’s role in the civil rights struggles of the twentieth century. It 
is also a major contribution to the broader debate over the efficacy of 
judicial power as a tool for protecting oppressed minority groups. 
Reviews of From Jim Crow to Civil Rights have focused primarily on 
Klarman’s discussion of Brown.7 Like other revisionist writings,8 
Klarman’s initial works on race and the Supreme Court principally focused 
on the limitations of Brown and its immediate progeny as vehicles for 
desegregating schools.9 But while Klarman provides a detailed and thought-
provoking history of Brown and its impact, most of the book is devoted to 
events and cases that predated Brown and had no direct connection to 
school desegregation. This Review focuses primarily on this broader history 
(especially with regard to the Progressive Era), in part to redress the 
unbalanced treatment of Klarman’s book found in most other reviews, and 
in part because of the expertise of the authors, but mostly because Brown 
has peculiar features that make it an unfair exemplar of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence regarding minority rights. In particular, it seems inappropriate 
to judge the efficacy of judicial review by the one Supreme Court opinion 
of the twentieth century to attract massive resistance from an entire region 
of the United States. 
This Review provides a balanced appreciation of Klarman’s 
impressively multifaceted analysis. Without losing sight of the many 
important insights and historical details that Klarman provides, the Review 
focuses on some of the weaknesses in his argument. While Klarman is right 
to reject the view that courts could, by themselves, eliminate Jim Crow and 
other forms of oppression, he underestimates both the willingness and the 
ability of courts to make a difference. Klarman properly emphasizes the 
limits of law as a tool for protecting oppressed minorities, and his work, 
like that of other revisionists,10 serves as a useful corrective to that of 
 
6. Klarman’s critique of judicial power in the present work was prefigured in several articles. 
See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. 
REV. 7 (1994) [hereinafter Klarman, Racial Change]; Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996); Michael J. Klarman, What’s So 
Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145 (1998).  
7. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, “Happy” Birthday Brown v. Board of Education? Brown’s 
Fiftieth Anniversary and the New Critics of Supreme Court Muscularity, 90 VA. L. REV. 693 
(2004) (review of Klarman’s book focused primarily on Brown); Randall Kennedy, Schoolings in 
Equality: What Brown Did and Did Not Accomplish, NEW REPUBLIC, July 5 & 12, 2004, at 29 
(same); Cass R. Sunstein, Did Brown Matter?, NEW YORKER, May 3, 2004, at 102 (same). 
8. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 4; ROSENBERG, supra note 4.  
9. Klarman, Racial Change, supra note 6; Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race 
Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994). 
10. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4. 
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formerly dominant judicial triumphalists who have overstated the power of 
litigation as a tool for social change. Yet Klarman, while more modest in 
his conclusions than some of his revisionist predecessors, at times 
underestimates the importance of Supreme Court decisions and of law more 
generally. An accurate understanding of the role of the Supreme Court in 
aiding or preventing the oppression of minorities—which is important both 
to understand our past and to escape future errors—requires avoiding both 
undue hagiography and undue skepticism. 
Part I of this Review summarizes Klarman’s analysis of the 
development of Supreme Court civil rights jurisprudence in the Jim Crow 
era. Although Klarman covers a wide range of cases and issues, there is a 
common theme of skepticism about the importance of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence both in contributing to the oppression of African Americans 
and in reducing that oppression.11 
Judges’ ability to affect the condition of African Americans was, 
Klarman argues, severely limited by two major constraints. First, judges 
“rarely hold views that deviate far from dominant public opinion.”12 They 
are therefore “unlikely to have the inclination . . . to defend minority rights 
from majoritarian invasion.”13 Second, even in the rare cases where judges 
are inclined to protect oppressed minorities, they generally will be unable to 
do so because deeply rooted oppression, such as that imposed on African 
Americans in the Jim Crow era, “depended more on social custom and 
physical force than on law.”14 In Klarman’s view, 
 
Most Jim Crow laws merely described white supremacy; 
they did not produce it. Legal disfranchisement measures 
and de jure railroad segregation played relatively minor 
roles in disfranchising and segregating southern blacks. 
Entrenched social mores, reinforced by economic power 
and the threat and reality of physical violence, were 
primarily responsible for bolstering the South’s racial 
hierarchy. Legal instantiation of these norms was often 
more symbolic than functional. Thus, more favorable Court 
 
11. Klarman’s refusal to credit or blame the Court for the ups and downs of blacks’ status 
was reflected in the original working title of Klarman’s book, Neither Hero Nor Villain: The 
Supreme Court, Race, and the Constitution in the Twentieth Century. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, 
NEITHER HERO NOR VILLAIN: THE SUPREME COURT, RACE, AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY—CHAPTER 1: THE PLESSY ERA (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies 
Working Paper No. 99-3a, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=169262. 
12. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 6. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 7. 
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rulings, even if enforceable, would not have alleviated the 
oppression of southern blacks.15 
 
This two-pronged attack on the importance of judicial power pervades 
Klarman’s analysis of a wide range of issues, though he is careful to note 
that some decisions had an impact at the margin.16 Klarman, like Gerald 
Rosenberg,17 attributes the eventual improvement in the legal, social, and 
political position of African Americans after World War II primarily to 
broad social forces rather than to changes in the law.18 
Part II provides a theoretical framework outlining important 
qualifications to Klarman’s view that judicial power had little impact on 
Jim Crow because the judiciary was usually both unwilling and unable to 
have a major effect. Economists and political scientists have devoted only 
limited attention to understanding the mechanisms and effects of public-
sector discrimination,19 but more general economic literature suggests that 
attempts by Southern whites to establish inflexible and unyielding 
discriminatory norms necessarily ran into problems. Particularly important 
was the problem of collective action.20 Jim Crow laws that sanctioned white 
defectors were often necessary to prevent collective action problems from 
unraveling the system of white supremacy.21 These laws also helped to 
establish and maintain white supremacy through cost externalization. As we 
shall see, many Jim Crow laws fulfilled the function of externalizing costs 
from individual whites and white-owned businesses onto society as a 
whole, including both African-American and white taxpayers.22 These laws 
also often served the purpose of cost minimization—ensuring that white 
 
15. Id. at 59-60. 
16. See, e.g., id. at 7; see also infra Part IV (discussing Brown). 
17. ROSENBERG, supra note 4. For the classic article arguing that courts have little power to 
resist public opinion and broad social trends, see Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a 
Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). 
18. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 4-5, 443-46. Klarman does not, however, go as far 
in this direction as Rosenberg. See Klarman, Racial Change, supra note 6, at 10 & n.9 (partially 
rejecting Rosenberg’s thesis with respect to Brown); see also infra Part IV. 
19. See Robert A. Margo, Segregated Schools and the Mobility Hypothesis: A Model of Local 
Government Discrimination, 106 Q.J. ECON. 61, 62 (1991) (“Economists have devoted 
considerable attention to modeling discrimination by private agents, but have been less interested 
in the formal analysis of discrimination in the public sector.”). 
20. For well-known general analyses of collective action theory, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN, 
THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS (1968); RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 
(1982); TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS (1980); and MANCUR OLSON, THE 
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).  
21. See generally Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133, 153, 
155-56 (1994) (arguing that racist Southern whites in the Jim Crow era could be analogized to a 
cartel, with the cartel subject to the same pressures that make standard economic cartels so 
difficult to enforce without supportive state action). 
22. The cost externalization point is raised in Jennifer Roback, Southern Labor Law in the 
Jim Crow Era: Exploitative or Competitive?, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1162-63 (1984). 
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supremacy was enforced at the lowest possible cost to white society. In 
these situations, judicial decisions invalidating Jim Crow could and often 
did have a substantial impact. 
Part II argues that Klarman’s otherwise commendable focus on broader 
social forces as the main cause of the eventual collapse of Jim Crow ignores 
ways in which those broader developments were in part dependent on a 
favorable legal environment. Part II also suggests that Klarman 
underestimates the degree to which judges are sometimes willing and able 
to reach decisions that run counter to majoritarian views. 
Part III addresses the Court’s Progressive Era decisions protecting 
African-American civil rights. This period poses a challenge to Klarman’s 
theory that Supreme Court decisions usually reflect the political and social 
climate of the times. Although the Progressive Era marked the worst period 
of post-Civil War American racism,23 it nonetheless witnessed a series of 
important decisions protecting the rights of southern blacks in four areas of 
law: defending African-American voting rights against so-called 
“grandfather clauses,” stating that Jim Crow laws must guarantee blacks 
equivalent railroad accommodations as were provided to whites, 
invalidating debt peonage laws intended to restrict the mobility of black 
labor, and invalidating housing segregation laws. 
Part IV of this Review considers Klarman’s insightful discussion of 
Brown v. Board of Education and its impact. Klarman contends that Brown 
did not, in and of itself, substantially reduce school segregation in the 
South;24 he claims, however, that the extreme and violent “massive 
resistance” of Southern whites to the Supreme Court’s decision 
strengthened Northern white commitment to civil rights and eventually led 
to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Unlike Brown, the Act led to 
the relatively rapid demise of school segregation throughout the South.25 
Klarman’s analysis, like that of other Brown skeptics, underestimates 
the impact of Brown on Southern public schools. It largely ignores changes 
in education policy, including major funding increases for African-
American schools, brought on by the mere threat of a school desegregation 
court decision.26 Furthermore, Klarman’s claim that Brown had, and could 
have had, little effect other than through the Northern response to the 
massive resistance of Southern whites raises an important question: Why 
did segregationists massively resist a court decision that was unlikely to 
have any real effect on their cherished institutions? A definitive answer to 
this question requires additional research. However, this Review tentatively 
 
23.  KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 63. 
24. Id. at 344-60. 
25. Id. at 360-63. 
26. See infra Section IV.A. 
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suggests that Brown might not have been as toothless as Klarman and other 
revisionist scholars suggest. 
I. SUMMARY OF KLARMAN’S THESIS 
This Part briefly summarizes the wide-ranging analysis of From Jim 
Crow to Civil Rights. The book is divided chronologically into five parts, 
covering the Plessy era,27 the Progressive Era,28 the interwar period,29 
World War II,30 and finally Brown and its impact.31 For convenience, this 
Part follows the same format. 
A. The Plessy Era 
The main theme of Klarman’s account of the Plessy era, roughly 1890 
to 1910, is that Plessy and other pro-segregation decisions were an 
inevitable byproduct of social and political developments that undermined 
Northern white support for African-American civil rights and strengthened 
Southern white opposition to racial change.32 Klarman also argues that Jim 
Crow laws were not necessary to ensure the perpetuation of segregation and 
white supremacy, because a combination of social mores, private violence, 
and informal administrative discretion used against African Americans by 
low-level officials was more than sufficient to achieve the goals of white 
racists.33 The claim that Plessy did not mark a true watershed is not entirely 
original to Klarman.34 But he does give this argument its most 
thoroughgoing exposition and defense, applying it to a wide range of areas 
of civil rights law, including segregation in various settings, voting rights, 
jury service, and education.35 
B. The Progressive Era 
The Progressive Era cases decided during the 1910s seem to undermine 
Klarman’s thesis. As he notes, the period marked the “nadir” of post-Civil 
 
27. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at ch. 1. 
28. Id. ch. 2.  
29. Id. ch. 3. 
30. Id. chs. 4-5. 
31. Id. chs. 6-7. 
32. See id. at 58-59. 
33. See id. at 59-60. 
34. See, e.g., CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL 
INTERPRETATION (1987) (concluding that Plessy was a natural outgrowth of prior precedent and 
of the political climate of the time). 
35. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 48-52 (segregation); id. at 52-55 (voting rights); id. at 55-57 
(jury service); id. at 57-58 (education). 
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War racism in America.36 Yet African Americans won four major sets of 
cases in the Supreme Court between 1911 and 1917: Bailey v. Alabama37 
and United States v. Reynolds38 invalidated peonage laws “that coerced 
primarily black labor”;39 dicta in McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
Railway Co.40 stated that railroads acting under color of state segregation 
laws must ensure that black passengers have access to the same classes of 
accommodations as white passengers, even if black demand for a certain 
class of accommodation was too low to justify providing it from a railroad’s 
economic perspective; Guinn v. United States41 and Myers v. Anderson42 
held that “grandfather clauses” that implicitly discriminated against 
potential black voters violated the Fifteenth Amendment; and Buchanan v. 
Warley43 held that a residential segregation ordinance unconstitutionally 
deprived both whites and African Americans of property rights without due 
process of law. 
Klarman claims that the peonage and grandfather clause cases were 
easy decisions because the laws flagrantly violated the Constitution in ways 
that even the racist public opinion of the 1910s found reprehensible.44 
Furthermore, Klarman contends that the conflict with his thesis is largely 
dissipated if we recognize that the pro-civil rights Supreme Court decisions 
of the Progressive Era failed to “produce significant changes in racial 
practices.”45 In Part III, we dispute this interpretation, arguing that the 
peonage cases and Buchanan had important positive ramifications for black 
welfare. 
C. The Interwar Period 
The interwar years, Klarman notes, were a period of gradual 
improvement in the status of African Americans. Racial change was driven 
by gradual increases in black wealth and education levels, the “Great 
Migration” of African Americans to the more tolerant North and West, and 
a partial liberalization of white racial attitudes.46 The Supreme Court 
decisions on race during this period were a “mixed bag,” including both 
 
36. Id. at 63. 
37. 219 U.S. 219 (1911). 
38. 235 U.S. 133 (1914). 
39. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 61. 
40. 235 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1914). 
41. 238 U.S. 347 (1915). 
42. 238 U.S. 368 (1915). 
43. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
44. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 69-76. 
45. Id. at 96. 
46. Id. at 100-15. 
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victories and defeats for African Americans.47 Klarman concludes that 
overall, the interwar decisions made only “limited” advances in civil rights 
law, and claims that the Court’s sympathy for civil rights “advanced at 
roughly the same pace as the rest of the nation.”48 Moreover, he argues that 
even those decisions in which African Americans prevailed had little effect 
because they did not address private-sector discrimination and were often 
easily circumvented.49 
D. The World War II Era 
Klarman views World War II as “a watershed event in the history of 
American race relations.”50 During this period the social trends that aided 
blacks in the interwar period—rising black economic status, migration to 
the North, and liberalization in white attitudes—rapidly accelerated.51 
Moreover, the struggle against Nazi racism abroad helped discredit 
antiblack racism at home.52 Blacks who had served in the military or 
improved their economic status by working in wartime industries were 
emboldened to combat violations of their rights, contributing to a vast 
expansion in African-American legal and political activism.53 After the war, 
the impact of the antifascist struggle was augmented by that of the Cold 
War, which led influential white elites to view racial oppression as a 
hindrance to America’s efforts to win international support for the struggle 
against communism, especially among emerging Third World nations.54 
This period also saw a series of Supreme Court decisions significantly 
expanding protections for black civil rights in the South and border states. 
In Smith v. Allwright, the Court overruled a recent precedent and 
invalidated white primaries.55 Klarman grants this decision a greater impact 
than he is willing to concede to virtually any other covered in the book. He 
points out that black voter registration in the South increased from just three 
percent of all adults in 1940 to twenty percent in 1952, and concludes that 
Smith “was critical to this dramatic increase in the voting registration of 
southern blacks.”56 Klarman attributes this impressive effect to the threat of 
 
47. Id. at 99, 98-99. 
48. Id. at 99. 
49. Id. at 152-62. 
50. Id. at 173. 
51. Id. at 173-74. 
52. Id. at 174-77. 
53. Id. at 175-80. 
54. Id. at 182-84. For a more detailed analysis, see MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL 
RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000); and Mary L. Dudziak, 
Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988). 
55. 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (overruling Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935)). 
56. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 236-37. 
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federal criminal prosecution of recalcitrant Southern election officials and a 
newfound willingness of lower court judges to vigorously enforce and even 
extend Supreme Court voting rights decisions.57 The growing political 
influence of blacks in both the North and the South and slowly declining 
Southern white opposition to black voting also contributed to Smith’s 
impact.58 
This era saw other key Supreme Court victories for African-American 
rights. Klarman grants that some of these cases also had significant effects, 
though not as great as those of Smith. He concludes that the invalidation of 
the exclusion of blacks from state graduate schools in Sipuel v. Board of 
Regents,59 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,60 and Sweatt v. Painter61 
was “instrumental to desegregating higher education in the border states 
and the peripheral South.”62 Similarly, he finds that a series of decisions 
invalidating segregation in interstate railroads and buses had a meaningful 
impact on the ground.63 On the other hand, he argues that the rejection of 
judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants in Shelley v. 
Kraemer,64 and a series of criminal procedure cases expanding the 
protection of black defendants and potential jurors against discrimination, 
had little or no effect.65 
Nonetheless, Klarman’s treatment of the World War II era is notable 
for his willingness to concede that several decisions of this era had a 
substantial impact independent of, or at least in addition to, progress 
generated by social and political developments. As we shall see, some of 
the claims that he makes on behalf of Smith and other cases of this period 
may also be applicable to other decisions that he denies had any impact. 
E. Brown v. Board of Education and Its Aftermath 
As already noted, Klarman’s main argument in his lengthy discussion 
of Brown is that the case had little “direct” impact on school desegregation 
but did have a major indirect effect by promoting a massive and often 
violent Southern white backlash that repulsed Northerners and eventually 
led them to support vigorous federal civil rights legislation. Klarman also 
concedes that Brown helped to mobilize black political activity on behalf of 
 
57. Id. at 237, 244-46. 
58. Id. at 180-81, 237-44. 
59. 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (per curiam). 
60. 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
61. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
62.  KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 253. 
63. Id. at 217-25, 264-65. 
64. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
65. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 225-32, 262-64, 267-86. 
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civil rights.66 Ultimately, however, he concludes that any such effect was 
fairly small and that the rise in black activism in the late 1950s and early 
1960s was primarily caused by “[d]eep background forces” such as rising 
black expectations, the example of the decolonization of Africa, and the 
increasing education and political awareness of Southern blacks.67 Like 
Gerald Rosenberg before him,68 Klarman even argues that Brown may have 
actually “discouraged direct-action protest,” at least in the “short term,” 
because it raised false hopes that civil rights goals could be achieved 
through litigation alone.69 
II. WHY JUDICIAL POWER MATTERS: ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS 
This Part examines several key theoretical reasons to expect that 
judicial decisions might have an important impact on the rights of 
oppressed minorities, even in a political environment in which most of the 
majority group supports, or is at best indifferent to, oppressive policies. 
Although Klarman is commendably thorough in his analysis of the 
historical record, he makes little effort to consider relevant theoretical 
literature from economics and political science. This relative neglect of 
theory leads Klarman to underestimate the extent to which the enforcement 
of Jim Crow laws was necessary to sustain white racial domination of 
blacks, even in a period when white opinion was overwhelmingly racist. 
The first three Sections present three tasks that laws performed in the 
maintenance of Jim Crow: solving collective action problems among racist 
whites, externalizing the costs of segregation and oppression, and 
minimizing the costs of maintaining a system of white supremacy.   
An additional omission from Klarman’s analysis is his failure to 
consider the possibility that some of the broader social forces to which he 
attributes the ultimate collapse of Jim Crow were in fact partially dependent 
on a favorable legal environment. Moreover, Klarman does not sufficiently 
explore why judges might be expected to go against dominant public 
opinion or at least to reach decisions protecting black rights that would not 
have been undertaken by politicians. These considerations are addressed in 
the final two Sections of this Part. 
 
66. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 368-81. 
67. Id. at 377, 376-77. 
68. See ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 146-50 (arguing that Brown strengthened the NAACP’s 
commitment to a litigation strategy and exacerbated rivalries between the NAACP and black 
organizations more oriented toward protest). 
69. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 377. 
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A. Jim Crow and the Logic of Collective Action 
1. Collective Action as an Obstacle to White Cooperation in 
Suppressing Blacks 
A collective action problem arises if a group of individuals is seeking to 
produce a “public good”—a benefit for the group that, if produced, will be 
nonrivalrous and nonexcludable.70 That is, one group member’s 
consumption of the good does not interfere with that of others, and it is 
impossible to exclude any group members from enjoying the benefits of the 
good once it has been produced. In such a situation, group members will 
have an incentive to free-ride on the production of the good so long as the 
failure of any one member to contribute her share will not by itself prevent 
the good from being produced.71 A collective problem is exacerbated if 
group members who free-ride not only save the direct costs of contribution 
but can actually reap substantial additional private benefits by defecting. 
For example, a firm that defects from a price-fixing cartel might reap 
disproportionately large profits as long as other cartel members continue to 
adhere to the cartel’s rules.  
The enforcement of Jim Crow segregation and white supremacy 
provided public goods for whites who desired these things. If blacks were 
barred from desirable economic opportunities, prevented from competing 
with whites, and disfranchised, even those whites who had not made any 
contribution to the achievement of these goals could potentially reap the 
perceived benefits of maintaining racial dominance. In most circumstances, 
an individual white’s failure to contribute was unlikely to make a 
significant difference with respect to the outcome. This created an incentive 
for individual whites to free-ride on the efforts of others to maintain Jim 
Crow segregation and thus a motive for whites to seek legislation to enforce 
Jim Crow norms. As Robert Cooter has noted, “[D]iscriminatory social 
groups suffer the same problems of instability as any other cartel. To 
sustain discriminatory norms, evaders must be punished by a combination 
of informal sanctions and formal laws.”72 
 Cooter’s point is that collective action theory applies not only to 
traditional economic price-fixing cartels, but to any situation where a group 
attempts to achieve a goal that individual members have an incentive to 
undercut through actions that benefit them personally at the expense of the 
 
70. For the general theory of public goods, see BUCHANAN, supra note 20. See also Paul A. 
Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954) (giving 
an early presentation of the theory). 
71. OLSON, supra note 20, at 9-16. 
72. Cooter, supra note 21, at 156. 
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common purpose. Moreover, collective action problems do not occur only 
among “selfish” individuals actuated solely by narrow self-interest.73 In a 
situation where his or her cooperation or lack thereof will not by itself 
affect the outcome, even a highly altruistic individual might choose not to 
contribute to the public good but will instead direct her efforts to helping 
others in ways that will in fact make a meaningful difference.74 
 Jim Crow was a comprehensive social system that restricted a wide 
range of interactions between blacks and whites for the purpose of 
maintaining white supremacy. As we shall see, the system included 
traditional economic activities such as employment relations, but went far 
beyond them. It applied also to a wide range of social norms, many of 
which involved collective action problems that segregationists sought to 
address through legal enforcement. The cartel model applies to these 
activities no less than to traditional economic cartels. 
For example, even the Jim Crow ban on interracial sexual relations and 
marriage involved an attempt to solve a collective action problem among 
whites through a cartel mechanism. While whites as a group, according to 
the racist view, had a common interest in maintaining the “purity” of their 
race and ensuring that white supremacy was not undercut through racial 
integration caused by intermarriage, the maintenance of the system required 
individual whites to forgo potentially appealing intimate relationships and 
marriages with black partners.75 For this reason, segregationists believed 
that antimiscegenation laws were essential to prevent racial 
“amalgamation” even in an era when the vast majority of whites held racist 
views hostile to interracial relationships.76 
Klarman concludes that “[w]hite supremacy depended less on law than 
on entrenched social mores, backed by economic power and the threat and 
reality of violence. Invalidating legislation scarcely would have made a 
dent in this system.”77 Rather, only federal civil rights laws could 
 
73. The belief that collective action theory relies on the assumption that all human behavior is 
selfish is a common misunderstanding among scholars critical of the model. For examples of this 
misconception, see the works cited in Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal, 12 
CRITICAL REV. 413, 436 (1998). 
74. Id.; see also OLSON, supra note 20, at 64-65. 
75. See generally RENEE C. ROMANO, RACE MIXING: BLACK-WHITE MARRIAGE IN 
POSTWAR AMERICA 44-144 (2003) (providing numerous examples of whites who sought 
interracial relationships during the Jim Crow era). 
76. For example, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held in 1878 that “[t]he purity of 
public morals, the moral and physical development of both races, and the highest advancement of 
our cherished southern civilization,” Kinney v. Commonweath, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858, 869 
(1878), required that interracial marriage be prevented “by prohibiting and punishing such 
unnatural alliances with severe penalties,” id. at 866, so as to ensure that there would be “no 
evasion” of the rule by individual whites and blacks, id. at 869. 
77. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 82. 
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significantly help blacks.78 Yet, if one sees Jim Crow as a wide-ranging 
racist cartel, formal law enforcing the cartel’s objectives was hardly 
superfluous to its success.  
Obviously, the best way to break up an existing local cartel—especially 
one that frequently uses violence with the acquiescence of local 
authorities—is through the enforcement of a vigorous federal antitrust law, 
and one can see the federal civil rights laws of the 1960s as serving an 
analogous function regarding the South’s white supremacist Jim Crow 
cartel. But this hardly shows that the Jim Crow cartel would not have been 
weaker, perhaps even far weaker, if it had received less support from the 
state in helping it externalize costs and overcome collective action problems 
in particular contexts.79 If the racist cartel had received additional support 
from the state—for example, if legally sanctioned chattel slavery had 
continued for another hundred years—it would have been far more difficult 
for federal authorities to break it up later.80 
2. The Cases of Labor Mobility and Housing Segregation 
The history of Southern white efforts to reduce the mobility of black 
laborers and force them to stay with one employer on a near-permanent 
basis provides an example of how collective action problems impeded 
white efforts to control blacks and how repressive laws were adopted to 
prevent breakdowns in cooperation among whites. In the post-Civil War 
period, Southern white planters repeatedly attempted to form cartels81 in 
order to keep down the wages of the sharecroppers and agricultural laborers 
who formed the vast majority of the black population82 and prevent them 
 
78. Id. 
79. The Mafia, for example, uses “economic power and the threat and reality of violence” to 
enforce its norms. Id. That hardly means, however, that the Mafia would not significantly benefit 
from official government endorsement and enforcement of those norms. 
80. The fact that the Jim Crow cartel operated not only in the economic realm but was also an 
oppressive and authoritarian social system does not rebut the view that law played an important 
role in its maintenance. When citizens become sufficiently disgruntled about a policy or regime, 
sometimes all it takes to catalyze dissent is a few sincere voices or a minor event that casts doubt 
on the durability of the status quo. See generally TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: 
THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION (1995). That the postbellum legal 
system never countenanced an assault on black property rights and self-ownership ultimately 
provided the civil rights movement with the ability to challenge the system both from within the 
South and also via migration to the North. 
81.  See WILLIAM COHEN, AT FREEDOM’S EDGE: BLACK MOBILITY AND THE SOUTHERN 
WHITE QUEST FOR RACIAL CONTROL, 1861-1915, at 42 (1991) (“All over the South planters 
eagerly sought to act collectively to hold down wages and to enforce contracts.”); Roback, supra 
note 22, at 1161. 
82. See ROBERT HIGGS, COMPETITION AND COERCION: BLACKS IN THE AMERICAN 
ECONOMY, 1865-1914, at 41, 63 tbl.4.1 (1977). 
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from leaving abusive employers.83 However, these efforts almost always 
foundered because individual white employers had strong incentives to 
renege on cartel arrangements and attempt to hire away black laborers from 
their competitors.84 
In the late nineteenth century, Southern states enacted peonage laws 
and other restrictive legislation in an attempt to enforce white control of 
black laborers.85 These laws substantially reduced black labor mobility 
relative to what had existed in the face of previous voluntary efforts to 
enforce white collusion against blacks, efforts consistently undermined by 
collective action problems.86 The evidence that the Supreme Court’s 
invalidation of peonage laws reduced this limitation on black labor mobility 
is discussed in Section III.B below. The collective action problem also 
applied to white efforts to keep blacks out of white neighborhoods. White 
support for keeping blacks out of white neighborhoods was very strong in 
the early twentieth century. Nonetheless, individual whites often had an 
incentive to defect from the numerous formal and informal voluntary 
arrangements set up to exclude blacks. Individual white property owners 
had an interest in getting the highest possible price when selling property. 
Such incentives were accentuated in situations where white property 
owners feared that other whites in the neighborhood were also about to sell 
to blacks or indeed had already done so; if whites were unwilling to sell to 
blacks earlier, they might end up doing so later after prices in the area had 
fallen as a result of a black influx.87 
 In the area of housing policy, local governments adopted residential 
segregation statutes intended to externalize the costs of enforcing 
neighborhood boundaries and solve the collective action problems white 
property owners experienced when trying to prevent blacks from moving 
 
83. STEPHEN J. DECANIO, AGRICULTURE IN THE POSTBELLUM SOUTH: THE ECONOMICS OF 
PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY 38-40 (1974); HIGGS, supra note 82, at 47-49.  
84. COHEN, supra note 81, at 42 (“The evidence is . . . clear, however, that such efforts to 
‘combine in self defense’ generally ended in failure.”); HIGGS, supra note 82, at 47-49. See 
generally RAY STANNARD BAKER, FOLLOWING THE COLOR LINE: AMERICAN NEGRO 
CITIZENSHIP IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 79-80 (Dewey W. Grantham, Jr. ed., Harper & Row 1964) 
(1908) (discussing Atenant stealers”—planters who offered better wages and working conditions to 
lure away African-American workers from neighboring planters). [LE: bring to OP] 
85. COHEN, supra note 81 (reviewing the panoply of laws intended to stifle black migration, 
the effects of these laws, and opposition to these laws among Southerners who sought to 
encourage black out-migration); Roback, supra note 22, at 1165-70 (discussing the types of laws 
enacted); Jonathan M. Wiener, Class Structure and Economic Development in the American 
South, 1865-1955, 84 AM. HIST. REV. 970, 979-82 (1979) (reviewing laws used to stifle black 
labor mobility). 
86. See Roback, supra note 22, at 1184-91. 
87. See David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober Controlling Philip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in 
Historical Perspective, 51 VAND. L. REV. 797, 859 (1998) (noting that when blacks started to 
move into a white neighborhood, the remaining white neighbors would often panic and sell at 
“fire sale” prices). 
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into white neighborhoods. Section III.D shows that the Supreme Court’s 
invalidation of these statutes in Buchanan v. Warley88 substantially 
improved black access to housing by restoring the collective action 
problems that existed in the absence of formal segregation laws. 
 
3. Using Collective Action Theory To Help Explain Variation in the 
Effectiveness of Judicial Intervention on Behalf of Blacks 
Collective action theory helps explain why some judicial interventions 
to protect black rights were relatively effective while others were largely 
futile. In situations where the enforcement of white supremacy required 
only the cooperation of white government officials, the invalidation of 
specific discriminatory laws could easily be evaded by means of continued 
discrimination through administrative discretion. By contrast, formal laws 
were much more important to the maintenance of Jim Crow in policy areas 
where maintaining the system required the cooperation of white private-
sector economic actors who had pecuniary incentives to defect from Jim 
Crow arrangements.89 
As Klarman effectively documents in his book, a series of Supreme 
Court decisions invalidating laws disfranchising blacks proved to be almost 
completely ineffective in increasing black voter registration in the South.90 
He tells a similar story about the Supreme Court’s even more extensive 
efforts to crack down on antiblack discrimination in the criminal justice 
system.91 In both sets of cases, white state officials found a variety of ways 
to circumvent the Court’s decisions and continue to discriminate against 
blacks.92 In the case of discrimination in voter registration, a major 1949 
study by Harvard political scientist V.O. Key found that the exclusion of 
blacks was often accomplished not through the application of specific laws 
 
88. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
89. For a similar argument in the context of analyzing the impact of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions protecting abortion rights, see ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 195-99 (noting that Roe v. 
Wade had a major impact on the availability of abortions by freeing private abortion clinics from 
restrictions imposed by state laws banning or closely regulating first-trimester abortions). 
Rosenberg acknowledges that this conclusion is a departure from his generally highly skeptical 
view of the effectiveness of judicial intervention. Id. at 199-201. He concludes that “the 
availability of a market mechanism for implementation meant that in states where actors were 
willing to perform abortions change could occur despite the opposition of key institutional actors” 
to the Court’s decision. Id. at 201. 
90. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 85-86, 158-59. 
91. Id. at 152-58, 225-32, 267-86. 
92. Id. at 457. 
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but through the exercise of broad administrative discretion delegated to 
local registrars.93 
The registrars who disfranchised black voters and the state prosecutors, 
police officers, and judges who discriminated against black criminal 
defendants and potential jurors had little or no incentive to treat blacks 
fairly. Indeed, they might well have been sanctioned or dismissed by their 
political superiors if they chose not to discriminate. Key noted that, in most 
Jim Crow-era Southern states, registrars were appointed by a centralized 
election board tightly controlled by the state Democratic Party.94 
Presumably, only officials willing and able to use their broad discretionary 
powers to exclude blacks from the franchise were likely to be selected and 
subsequently reappointed. 
Thus, unlike white employers of black labor or white homeowners 
seeking to exclude blacks from their neighborhoods, white public officials 
in the electoral and legal systems were not handicapped by collective action 
problems in their efforts to perpetuate white supremacy. Indeed, to the 
extent that these officials belonged to a hierarchical bureaucracy headed by 
higher-level administrators committed to Jim Crow, they actually had 
strong private interests in discrimination even in the unlikely event that they 
were personally indifferent or hostile to the goals of the system. As long as 
this was the case, discrimination against blacks in areas such as voting and 
criminal justice was not significantly dependent on the establishment of 
formal discriminatory laws that might be rendered inoperative by judicial 
decisions. 
Policy areas where enforcement of Jim Crow required the cooperation 
of private economic actors with incentives to resist rooted in collective 
action problems allowed much greater opportunities for effective judicial 
intervention. Although they may well have been just as racist as were 
public officials, these actors often would only cooperate with the system if 
required to do so by laws supported by significant sanctions.95 
Smith v. Allwright,96 the one voting rights decision to which Klarman 
ascribes a high degree of effectiveness,97 further reinforces the explanatory 
power of collective action theory. As Klarman perceptively emphasizes, by 
the 1940s, Southern registrars who continued to flout Smith’s requirement 
that blacks be allowed to vote in primaries on the same basis as whites 
 
93. V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 560-76 (1949). Key’s book 
was based on interviews with politicians, activists, and state officials all over the South. Roscoe C. 
Martin, Foreword to KEY, supra, at vi-vii. 
94. KEY, supra note 93, at 561-63. 
95. See the discussion of peonage and residential segregation laws infra Sections III.B and 
III.D. 
96. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
97. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 236-45. 
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risked criminal prosecution by the Justice Department and suits for money 
damages.98 Even though the Justice Department was far from consistent in 
carrying out such threats,99 the mere possibility of personal criminal or civil 
liability was enough to deter some registrars from continuing their 
discriminatory practices.100 
By imposing a potential private cost on registrars, the Court and the 
Justice Department effectively created a collective action problem for them 
similar to that facing white planters who sought to form a cartel to control 
black laborers. Although the Department lacked the will or the resources to 
force compliance on registrars throughout the South had they all refused to 
follow Smith,101 individual registrars were hesitant to take the risk of 
noncompliance because they lacked any assurance that their colleagues in 
neighboring jurisdictions would do the same. And an isolated flouter of 
federal authority likely faced an unusually high risk of prosecution. 
B. Cost Externalization 
The problem of cost externalization is related to, but nonetheless 
distinct from, that of collective action. Even in a situation where efforts to 
enforce white supremacy did not suffer from collective action problems 
because the contributions of an individual white could have a substantial 
impact in their own right, that individual might still choose not to act 
because of the high cost of doing so. Jim Crow laws could alleviate this 
reluctance by externalizing some or all of the costs of enforcement from 
those individual whites to society as a whole. 
Once again, white planters’ efforts to control black labor provide a 
helpful example. Although white efforts to form a cartel under which the 
planters agreed not to hire away each others’ workers were subject to 
collective action problems and defection, any individual planter could 
potentially avoid collective action problems by using the threat of violence 
to prevent his own employees from leaving or demanding higher wages. In 
fact, some did just that.102 However, resort to violence entailed considerable 
costs: Either the planter would have to take the risk of attacking recalcitrant 
black employees himself, or he would have to hire brutal thugs to serve as 
enforcers. Moreover, even in the Plessy era, white planters were 
occasionally punished for egregious acts of violence against black 
 
98. Id. at 241, 458. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 241. 
101. See id. (noting that “the [Justice] [D]epartment remained reluctant to prosecute”). 
102. See, e.g., HIGGS, supra note 82, at 75-76. 
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workers.103 In some instances, blacks were bold enough to fight back, 
further increasing the risks faced by white planters.104 
Peonage laws greatly reduced the costs faced by white planters seeking 
to coerce black workers by shifting the costs and risks of enforcement to 
law enforcement authorities paid for by the public fisc. A study by 
economist Jennifer Roback concludes that “Southern planters may have 
found it . . . profitable to collude to hold down black wages . . . only as long 
as they could pass the enforcement costs on to state and local 
governments.”105 She notes that nearly all peonage laws adopted by 
Southern states included criminal penalties.106 This is significant because 
criminal law is enforced entirely at public expense, whereas civil remedies 
are only effective if private plaintiffs are willing to assume the cost of 
litigation. 
A similar story could be told about white property owners seeking to 
exclude blacks from their neighborhoods. While violence could be and 
sometimes was used to scare off black residents, the costs of such action 
were much higher than simply leaving the job to state authorities enforcing 
residential segregation laws. First, not all whites were willing to use 
violence to keep out blacks, and some ethnic groups (Jews in particular)107 
were disinclined sociologically to use violence to exclude blacks from their 
neighborhoods. Second, violence raised the risks of a violent response. For 
example, Klarman discusses the case of Dr. Ossian Sweet, who killed one 
member of a Detroit mob trying to drive him from his home and wounded 
another.108 Third, the use of violence carried the risk of arrest and possible 
prosecution, especially in the North. Law enforcement protection of blacks 
was hardly perfect and varied dramatically depending on the circumstances, 
but it was not nonexistent, either. Even in the South, some influential 
whites—real estate interests, white business elites concerned with the image 
of their cities, and whites who generally opposed lawlessness of any form—
 
103. See 9 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 1910-21, at 
841-56 (1984) (describing Justice Department prosecutions during the Roosevelt and Taft 
Administrations); see also William F. Holmes, Whitecapping: Agrarian Violence in Mississippi, 
1902-1906, 35 J.S. HIST. 165 (1969) (explaining that some Southern courts convicted whites who 
used violence to drive blacks from their homes). 
104. HIGGS, supra note 82, at 76. 
105. Roback, supra note 22, at 1163. 
106. Id. at 1166. 
107. See, e.g., JONATHAN KAUFMAN, BROKEN ALLIANCE: THE TURBULENT TIMES 
BETWEEN BLACKS AND JEWS IN AMERICA 171-72 (1988) (contrasting the relatively passive 
Jewish reactions in the 1960s when blacks started to enter their neighborhoods with the violence 
met by blacks in other neighborhoods). 
108. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 133-34. 
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were opposed to violence and were inclined to pressure local officials to 
prevent it (with varying degrees of success).109 
Indeed, one reason common carriers such as railroads and streetcar 
companies were often hostile to segregation laws was that their employees 
were forced to serve as the primary enforcers of the laws. Not only did such 
enforcement cost the company time and money, but it caused many 
problems when, for example, train conductors needed to decide whether an 
individual with a medium skin tone was a “light skinned negro” or a “dark 
skinned white.” Railroads faced lawsuits both for being insufficiently 
vigorous in enforcing separate-car laws and for mistakenly assigning whites 
to “negro” cars.110 Streetcars, where the costs of enforcement of segregation 
were very high, were largely integrated before the law intervened.111 
C. Cost Minimization: Raising the Price of Oppressive Policies 
White supporters of Jim Crow were committed to maintaining white 
supremacy, but for most it was not their only value. Southern whites sought 
to maintain segregation in ways that minimized the cost to themselves. This 
consideration is related to that of cost externalization but distinct from it. 
Cost externalization arises from the desire of some actors to change the 
distribution of the costs imposed by the maintenance of segregation. The 
concept of cost minimization, on the other hand, stems from Southern 
whites’ desire to minimize the total amount of costs. 
If the cost of segregation became too high, whites might no longer have 
been willing to pay it, or at least might have preferred to reduce the scope 
of the system. This idea of a shift in the “supply curve” for segregation has 
not been systematically applied to analysis of the impact of judicial review 
on policies that discriminate against blacks and other minority groups. The 
potential impact is relatively clear: If judicial review eliminates or curtails 
the “cheapest” methods of maintaining a system of oppression, it could 
erode support for the maintenance of that system, even if judicial review 
 
109. See, e.g., W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND 
VIRGINIA, 1880-1930, at 223-24 (1993) (noting that the business and media elite in Atlanta 
campaigned against mob violence out of fear for their city’s reputation); LEON F. LITWACK, 
TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW 158 (1998) (discussing 
incentives whites had to prevent violence); MORTON SOSNA, IN SEARCH OF THE SILENT SOUTH 
(1977) (discussing “southern liberals” who opposed violence against blacks). 
110. See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 138-43 (2001); 
BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE, LAW, AND THE 
RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 1865-1920, at 356-59 (2001). 
111. See Jennifer Roback, The Political Economy of Segregation: The Case of Segregated 
Streetcars, 46 J. ECON. HIST. 893 (1986). 
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did not lead to an immediate increase in respect for minority rights. As this 
Review shall argue, this concept helps to elucidate Brown’s significance.112 
D. Judicial Power and the Rise of External Social Forces Favoring Blacks 
Klarman rightly emphasizes the role of broad social forces in 
accounting for the increased respect and protection for black civil rights. 
His argument and Gerald Rosenberg’s similar claim113 are important 
correctives to traditional accounts, which focus almost exclusively on the 
role of the judiciary.114 However, Klarman neglects the possibility that 
some of the social forces to which he attributes racial progress were in part 
dependent upon favorable legal decisions. 
In particular, Supreme Court decisions striking down peonage laws and 
racial segregation laws played a key role in protecting black mobility.115 
This is of vital importance because Klarman correctly emphasizes the 
crucial role of mobility in black advancement.116 The Great Migrations of 
blacks to the North in the 1910s and during and after World War II enabled 
first hundreds of thousands and later millions of blacks to better their 
economic prospects and gain access to improved education.117 The ability 
of blacks to vote in the North ensured that the growth of the black 
population there would eventually translate into greater black political 
influence in the nation as a whole, ultimately forcing national politicians to 
confront the Jim Crow system in the South.118 
Klarman deserves credit for being one of the few legal scholars to 
recognize that migration to the North also had a significant immediate 
impact on the treatment of blacks who remained in the South. Fear of losing 
their black labor force led white planters and businessmen to treat blacks 
better and to lobby for laws ameliorating the most egregious practices of 
Jim Crow. “Thus, the black exodus induced southern cities and states to 
promise, and occasionally deliver, ameliorative policies, such as 
antilynching laws, increased educational spending, higher agricultural 
wages, and fairer legal treatment.”119 As a 1917 NAACP publication put it, 
 
112. See infra Section IV.C. 
113. ROSENBERG, supra note 4. 
114. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (rev. and expanded ed. 2004). Kluger’s 
book, originally published in 1975, played a key role in establishing the conventional wisdom on 
Brown. 
115. See infra Sections III.A-B. 
116. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 100-02, 163-64, 173-74, 178. 
117. Id. at 100-03. 
118. Id. at 100-02, 173-78. 
119. Id. at 102. 
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migration was “the most effective protest against Southern lynching, 
lawlessness, and general deviltry.”120 
Migration within the South was also significant.121 Increasing black 
migration from the countryside to the cities enabled more blacks to gain 
better economic and educational opportunities and also to move to areas 
where a much higher proportion of blacks was allowed to vote. Even 
internal migration within the Southern countryside increasingly enabled 
blacks to better their prospects by forcing white employers both to bid 
against each other for their services and to ask their political representatives 
to provide better public services for blacks.122 
Substantial black migration both inside and outside the South would 
surely have occurred even in the complete absence of favorable judicial 
intervention. But to the extent that peonage laws significantly hindered 
rural blacks’ ability to leave their homes and employers,123 and to the extent 
that residential segregation laws made it harder for them to move to cities, 
Supreme Court intervention eliminating these obstacles played a critical 
and underemphasized role in hastening the end of Jim Crow oppression. 
E. Causes of Judicial Independence 
So far, this Part has focused on ways in which judicial power helped 
alleviate the plight of blacks under Jim Crow. However, even if the 
judiciary had the ability, we must still ask why it would have had the will. 
While we lack the space to consider the full range of possible reasons why 
the judiciary’s agenda might diverge from that of public opinion and 
political leaders, we do note several possibilities that are especially relevant 
to the history of civil rights jurisprudence.124 
Klarman himself ascribes significance to the fact that most jurists come 
from relatively wealthy and highly educated “elite” backgrounds. On some 
 
120. Editorial, Migration and Help, 13 CRISIS 115 (1917), quoted in KLARMAN, supra note 5, 
at 164. 
121. By the 1890s, African Americans were migrating within the South at historic levels. 
Indeed, “in the 1890s and 1900s every Southern state except Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida 
registered rates of black outmigration almost as great as in the famed ‘Great Migration’ of the 
World War I years.” EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER 
RECONSTRUCTION 151 (1992); id. at 493 n.56. 
122. See HIGGS, supra note 82, at 47-50, 75-77; see also David E. Bernstein, The Law and 
Economics of Post-Civil War Restrictions on Interstate Migration by African-Americans, 76 TEX. 
L. REV. 781, 783-84 (1998). 
123. For evidence that this was indeed the case, see Roback, supra note 22, at 1165-70; supra 
Section II.B; and infra Section III.A. 
124. In analyzing possible causes of judicial independence, this Review, like Klarman, 
focuses primarily on the U.S. Supreme Court. However, most points made in this Review also 
apply to other Article III courts. 
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issues, elite opinion systematically differs from that of non-elites.125 
Unfortunately, however, Klarman neglects several other relevant factors, 
which are discussed below. 
1. Life Tenure and Relative Insulation from Political Pressure 
The insulation provided by life tenure is the oldest of arguments for 
judicial independence. In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton argued 
that it would ensure that the judiciary would function as an “excellent 
barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body.”126 
While life tenure certainly does not give judges anything approaching 
complete immunity from political pressure,127 it does give them greater 
discretionary leeway than is usually enjoyed by elected officials and 
temporary political appointees. Relative to the latter, judges are 
comparatively immune to punishment by interest groups and others 
offended by their decisions. 
Moreover, regardless of personal prejudices, federal judges typically 
have institutional loyalty to the federal government and are protective of 
federal prerogatives. For example, federal judges in the late nineteenth 
century, almost none of whom had any personal sympathy for Chinese 
immigrants, generally (and in contrast to state courts) protected them from 
hostile local legislation by invoking the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
United States’s treaty obligations to China.128 Similarly, Ninth Circuit 
judges hearing immigration cases in the 1890s shared the prevalent negative 
attitude toward the Chinese, but were constrained by their “perception of 
their institutional obligations” and when “weighing the evidence in 
individual cases” often disregarded “the fact that the litigants were Chinese 
or of Chinese descent.”129 Indeed, anti-Chinese forces were sufficiently 
disturbed by judicial rulings that they lobbied to curtail federal courts’ 
jurisdiction to hear immigration cases. 130 
 
125. See KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 450, 452. 
126. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
127. There is an extensive scholarship outlining ways in which the political branches can 
influence judicial decisionmaking. For a helpful critical analysis of some of the literature, see LEE 
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 138-81 (1998). 
128. See CHARLES J. MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE 
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1994); David E. Bernstein, 
Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1999); David E. 
Bernstein, Two Asian Laundry Cases, 23 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 95 (1999). 
129. LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING 
OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW, at xvi (1995). 
130. Id. at xvii. 
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2. Generational Cohort Effects 
An important additional implication of life tenure is the fact that 
Justices will often be members of a much earlier generation than the 
majority of politicians and voters. Political scientists and sociologists have 
for a long time realized that people’s views on controversial political and 
ideological issues are often critically dependent on generation-specific 
formative experiences. Social scientists refer to these intergenerational 
differences in outlook as “cohort effects.”131 
Cohort effects lead to large intergenerational differences in attitudes on 
a wide range of political issues.132 While social scientists have long 
recognized the importance of cohort effects, those effects have not featured 
prominently in the debate among legal scholars over the role of the 
judiciary in protecting minority rights. Particularly important for our 
purposes is the well-documented finding that cohort effects have a huge 
impact on the public’s attitudes regarding racial issues.133 Modern public 
opinion research finds that later cohorts tend to be more racially tolerant 
than earlier ones.134 In the Progressive Era, however, white racism toward 
blacks was increasing rather than abating, and the fact that most Supreme 
Court Justices belonged to an older cohort probably made them more 
tolerant than the median voter and political officeholder.135 
3. Selection of Justices from Unrepresentative Subgroups Within the 
Population 
A variety of political pressures might lead presidents to select all or 
most of their Supreme Court appointments from a subset of the population 
with unrepresentative views on a given set of issues. For present purposes, 
it is significant that Justices will usually be selected from within the 
president’s own political party. Presidents sometimes will choose Justices 
who not only are members of their party, but who come from a faction 
within the party that is likely to best serve the president’s political and 
ideological purposes. 
In some cases, of course, Justices are deliberately chosen for their 
views on specific issues. But it is important to recognize that Justices 
chosen for their liberal views on Issue A may also be disproportionately 
 
131. See Norval D. Glenn, Distinguishing Age, Period, and Cohort Effects, in HANDBOOK OF 
THE LIFE COURSE 465 (Jeylan T. Mortimer & Michael J. Shanahan eds., 2003). 
132. See WILLIAM G. MAYER, THE CHANGING AMERICAN MIND 141-189 (1992). 
133. See HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA 196-229 (rev. ed. 
1997). 
134. Id. at 197-98. 
135. See infra Section III.E. 
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likely to have liberal views on Issue B, even if B was not a significant 
consideration in the president’s decision to appoint the Justice. 
Both types of unrepresentative selection bear on Klarman’s thesis. In 
the Progressive Era, most of the Justices on the Court had been picked by 
Republican presidents and were therefore members of the Republican Party. 
Because the Republican Party in that era had little support among white 
Southerners, these Republican Justices were all Northerners, and therefore 
none of them came from subgroups of the population that had the most 
hostile attitudes toward blacks. While not inevitable, it also is not surprising 
that these Justices did not look kindly on the expansion of Jim Crow 
legislation in the South in the cases that came before them. 
Under President Franklin Roosevelt, who made a record nine 
appointments to the Court, judicial selection was heavily influenced by 
factional and issue-based considerations, as well as by party considerations. 
Roosevelt sought to ensure that his appointees would be liberals who would 
vote to support broad presidential power; virtually unlimited federal power 
over economic regulation; and (to a much lesser degree) freedom of speech 
and religion.136 As a result, six of FDR’s nine appointees were Northern 
liberal Democrats, the group most likely to share these views.137 While 
“there is no clear evidence that FDR nominated jurists with a specific desire 
to advance African-American rights, his nominees’ adherence to rights-
centered liberalism combined with their devotion to defer to the executive 
branch ensured that the NAACP would find fertile ground to lay its 
antisegregation precedential seeds.”138 Although helping blacks was not 
FDR’s goal, the Justices drawn from the faction of the Democratic Party 
likely to support the President’s actual objectives were also—at that time—
more likely to oppose Jim Crow than the average white. 
In his book, Klarman recognizes that Brown, decided by a Court still 
dominated by the five remaining FDR appointees, was ahead of both public 
and political opinion in its willingness to strike down Southern school 
segregation.139 Klarman attributes the Justices’ stance to their “elite” 
status.140 Yet an important additional element was the manner in which they 
 
136. See KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE 
PRESIDENCY PAVED THE ROAD TO BROWN  97-143 (2004). 
137. Id. Of the three Southerners, James F. Byrnes, Stanley Reed, and Hugo Black, one 
(Byrnes) served only briefly, id. at 138, and another (Black) was actually a racial liberal, despite 
having once been a member of the Ku Klux Klan, id. at 111-12. 
138. Id. at 142. 
139. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 343, 450-52. Although, as Klarman notes, about half the 
public agreed with the Brown decision from the outset, he also recognizes that Brown came long 
before there was any strong political pressure on Congress to attack Jim Crow segregation 
directly, and acknowledges that the Court “played a vanguard role in school desegregation.” Id. at 
343. 
140. Id. at 450-52. 
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were chosen. Certainly, a random sample of nine members of the American 
elite of 1954 would have been unlikely to unanimously support the 
elimination of school desegregation.141 
III. RACE AND THE SUPREME COURT IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 
The major civil rights decisions of the Progressive Era illustrate the 
importance of considerations that Klarman fails to incorporate into his 
analytical framework. The Supreme Court turned out to be both more 
effective and more willing to take steps to protect some of the rights of 
African Americans than his argument would suggest. 
A. The Puzzle of the Progressive Era Race Decisions 
As noted previously, in the 1910s, at the height of the Progressive Era, 
the cause of black civil rights emerged victorious in four sets of cases.142 
The Progressive Era cases marked a turning point with regard to Supreme 
Court jurisprudence on race. According to one tally, the Supreme Court 
heard twenty-eight cases involving African Americans and the Fourteenth 
Amendment between 1868 and 1910. Of these, African Americans lost 
twenty-two.143 However, between 1920 and 1943, African Americans won 
twenty-five of twenty-seven Fourteenth Amendment cases before the 
Supreme Court.144 
The Progressive Era decisions came in a decade when “racial attitudes 
and practices seemed to have reached a post-Civil War nadir.”145 Most 
whites, including most white intellectuals, believed that African Americans 
were culturally and biologically inferior.146 Progressive political and 
intellectual leaders generally shared the racism of the day,147 and 
 
141. Although the Justices differed among themselves on the legal propriety of Brown, 
Klarman shows that all but Justice Reed agreed that school segregation was morally 
reprehensible. Id. at 294-301. 
142. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text. 
143. See BERNARD H. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE NEGRO SINCE 
1920, at 13-14 (1946). 
144. Id. at 162. 
145. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 63. 
146. “The literature of sociology was dominated by the view that Negroes were inferior to the 
white race in every way. This position of scholars both reflected and reinforced popular beliefs.” 
CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE 
RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES 65 (1959) (footnote omitted). 
147. See DAVID W. SOUTHERN, THE MALIGNANT HERITAGE: YANKEE PROGRESSIVES AND 
THE NEGRO QUESTION 1901-1914, at 48-49 (1968) (describing the racist connotations of scholarly 
works of the late nineteenth century); C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 1877-
1913, at 369-95 (1951) (asserting that both Northern and Southern Progressives shared a racist 
outlook). 
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Progressive social scientists promoted pseudo-scientific theories of race 
differences.148 Moreover, the political branches were overtly hostile to 
blacks. Politicians almost unanimously endorsed segregation; those who 
disagreed generally kept quiet.149 In 1912, Republican presidential 
candidate William Howard Taft and Progressive (and former Republican) 
candidate Theodore Roosevelt were so overtly hostile to the interests of 
blacks that many leading civil rights activists supported Southern Democrat 
Woodrow Wilson.150 The Wilson Administration, however, turned out to be 
consistently hostile to African Americans,151 and Congress was only 
marginally better.152 
As Klarman acknowledges,153 the historical context of the 1910s civil 
rights decisions is a problem for those, like him, who argue that “changes in 
the social and political context of race relations preceded and accounted for 
changes in judicial decision making.”154 The decisions of the Court during 
this period may tempt one to conclude that “this apparent disjunction 
between cases and context reveals that the justices possess a significant 
capacity to defend minority rights from majority oppression.”155 Yet 
Klarman resists this conclusion and instead suggests that the Progressive 
Era race cases simply “may show that where the law is relatively clear, the 
Court tends to follow it, even in an unsupportive context.”156 Klarman adds 
that except insofar as they inspired civil rights activists, the Court’s 
Progressive Era race decisions “proved inconsequential”:157 Southern 
peonage continued for decades; railroads continued to offer blacks unequal 
 
148. See THOMAS F. GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA 154-75 (1963) 
(discussing racist theories of this era). 
149. DESMOND KING, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: BLACK AMERICANS AND THE U.S. 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 21 (1995). 
150. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 67-68. 
151. See Henry Blumenthal, Woodrow Wilson and the Race Question, 48 J. NEGRO HIST. 1, 6 
(1963) (asserting that the Wilson Administration’s “discrimination against Negroes had all the 
earmarks of racial prejudice”); Cleveland M. Green, Prejudices and Empty Promises: Woodrow 
Wilson’s Betrayal of the Negro, 1910-1919, 87 CRISIS 380, 387 (1980) (“[F]or blacks, the Wilson 
years were a step backward in their struggle for advancement.”); Nancy J. Weiss, The Negro and 
the New Freedom: Fighting Wilsonian Segregation, 84 POL. SCI. Q. 61, 61 (1969) (“Woodrow 
Wilson’s first administration inaugurated officially-sanctioned segregation in the federal 
departments . . . .”). 
152. See generally Morton Sosna, The South in the Saddle: Racial Politics During the Wilson 
Years, 54 WIS. MAG. HIST. 30 (1970) (discussing Congress’s stance towards blacks during the 
Wilson years). 
153. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 62. 
154. Id. at 443. 
155. Id. at 62. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
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accommodations; Guinn and Myers enfranchised no blacks; and American 
cities became increasingly segregated.158 
With respect to the voting rights cases, Klarman makes a strong 
argument. While the Court could have constructed a plausible opinion 
upholding grandfather clauses,159 the laws in question were a rather blatant 
attempt to nullify the Fifteenth Amendment, and legal commentators had 
widely predicted that the Court would invalidate them.160 Even President 
Taft—like others who believed that the Fifteenth Amendment was 
misconceived but must be obeyed—thought that grandfather clauses were 
unconstitutional.161 And the practical implications of invalidating 
grandfather clauses were minimal, as Southern states had many other means 
of restricting the franchise. Indeed, in dicta the Guinn Court explicitly 
endorsed literacy tests. According to Klarman, this dictum “ensured that the 
ruling had no impact on black disfranchisement.”162 
Even if the Court had evinced less tolerance of disfranchisement 
mechanisms like literacy tests, in practice disfranchisement was primarily 
the responsibility of local officials who could use their bureaucratic 
discretion to the detriment of blacks and had every political incentive to do 
so.163 Ensuring blacks’ ability to vote in the South would have taken 
tremendous litigation resources (which civil rights activists did not have)164 
and the sustained support of the executive branch in supporting litigation 
efforts and protecting black registrants and voters from violence (which was 
not forthcoming).165 
Klarman’s argument becomes more dubious when one considers the 
peonage and railroad segregation cases, which are discussed in more detail 
below in Sections B and C, respectively. The strongest challenge to 
Klarman’s position comes from Buchanan v. Warley, discussed in Section 
D. Section E discusses why the Supreme Court suddenly became more 
sympathetic to civil rights during the Progressive Era. 
 
158. For a similar analysis of the Progressive Era race cases, see Randall Kennedy, Race 
Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1622 (1986). 
159. A detailed explanation of how the Court could have justified a ruling that came out the 
other way is found in 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 958-59 (1984). 
160. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 70. 
161. Id. at 71. 
162. Id. at 85. 
163. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (discussing Key’s work on 
disfranchisement). 
164. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 86. 
165. Between Plessy and the Truman Administration, the administration most friendly to 
black political aspirations was likely the short-lived Harding Administration. Harding sought to 
rejuvenate the Republican Party in the South, but unlike other prominent Republicans of his era, 
hoped to do so via a biracial coalition, not by turning the Republican Party lily white. 
Nevertheless, the Harding years saw only nominal efforts on voting rights. JOHN W. DEAN, 
WARREN G. HARDING 124-26 (2004). 
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B. The Peonage Cases 
After emancipation, employers responded to rising African-American 
wages by attempting to create voluntary cartels to assure a noncompetitive 
labor market.166 When these efforts failed, planters frequently turned to 
violence to limit black mobility.167 However, private violence had its limits: 
Its use required a certain level of brutality and lawlessness that only some 
plantation owners were prepared to exercise; it ran the risk of counter- or 
defensive violence; and it was costly, because it usually required payment 
to the overseers and underlings who carried out the violence. Not 
surprisingly, planters preferred to turn to government to externalize their 
costs in suppressing black mobility.168 Moreover, government was needed 
to solve the collective action problems created by the fact that individual 
planters had an incentive to lure black labor away from other planters by 
bidding up wages and working conditions.169 
The Fourteenth Amendment outlawed overt legislative discrimination, 
so the planters lobbied for facially neutral legislation.170 Among the laws 
used to suppress black labor mobility were emigrant agent laws, which 
restricted the rights of out-of-state labor recruiters; enticement laws, which 
prohibited an employer from “enticing” a worker under contract with 
another employer; the criminal surety and convict-lease system, which 
allowed the government to lease black workers convicted of petty crimes—
real or trumped up—to planters; and false pretenses laws, which made it a 
criminal offense to fail to repay an advance a worker had fraudulently 
accepted from his employer.171 
False pretenses laws and the criminal surety system frequently left 
blacks in a state of peonage. In Clyatt v. United States,172 the Court upheld 
the 1867 Peonage Act, which banned involuntary servitude when physical 
coercion was used to force a worker to pay off a debt. Six years later, the 
case of Bailey v. Alabama came to the Supreme Court.173 The issue in 
Bailey was the legality of an Alabama false pretenses law under the 
Peonage Act and the Thirteenth Amendment. After similar laws had been 
 
166. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. 
167. See, e.g., Frederick Douglass, The Nation’s Problem, Speech Made upon the Twenty-
Seventh Anniversary of Abolition in the District of Columbia (Apr. 16, 1889), in NEGRO SOCIAL 
AND POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1850-1920, at 323 (Howard Brotz ed., 1966) (reporting that violence 
was used against African Americans caught trying to migrate). 
168. See Roback, supra note 22. 
169. See supra Section II.A. 
170. DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR 
REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL 9 (2001).  
171. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 71-72. 
172. 197 U.S. 207 (1905). 
173. 219 U.S. 219 (1911).  
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invalidated or construed narrowly several times by federal and state courts, 
Alabama enacted a law that created a presumption of fraudulent intent 
whenever a worker breached a labor contract after receiving an advance 
from his employer.174 Moreover, the laborer was not even permitted to 
testify “as to his uncommunicated motives, purpose, or intention.”175 The 
Supreme Court invalidated the law, holding that it effectively criminalized 
ordinary breach of contract. 
Bailey marked “the first decision since Strauder v. West Virginia in 
1880 in which the Supreme Court took the side of black people in an 
important issue of race relations.”176 Nevertheless, and although the Court’s 
opinion drew dissents from Justices Holmes and Lurton, Klarman is correct 
that one can construe the case as legally and politically “easy.”177 Debt 
peonage was commonly understood as a form of involuntary servitude, and 
public support for debt peonage was minimal outside of the planter class. 
Even Wilson Administration Attorney General James McReynolds, who 
later became a Supreme Court Justice notorious for his racism, opposed 
peonage.178 
Indeed, McReynolds expedited the next black-labor case to reach the 
Supreme Court,179 United States v. Reynolds.180 Reynolds tested the legality 
of Alabama’s criminal surety laws. Criminal surety laws were not 
inherently objectionable, as formally they merely gave a convicted man a 
choice between paying a fine, serving jail time (likely on a chain gang as a 
leased convict), or working for a planter willing to pay off the fine. 
However, the Court chose not to ignore “the patent fraud in a system that 
routinely manufactured black criminals” and then entrapped them in a 
system in which they were destined to be long-term peons.181 
Given general societal revulsion toward peonage, Bailey and Reynolds 
do not, by themselves, seem to reflect any great progressiveness on racial 
issues by the Supreme Court. Klarman further argues that these cases “seem 
to have had little effect on peonage”182 and adds that “experts agree that 
southern peonage remained widespread after Bailey and Reynolds.”183 Both 
 
174. 1903 Ala. Acts 345-46. 
175. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 228 (citing Bailey v. State, 49 So. 886, 886 (1909), rev’d, 219 U.S. 
219 (1911)) (explaining that this was an evidentiary rule in Alabama, “which must be regarded as 
having the same effect as if read into the statute itself”). 
176. 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 888. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 
(1905), upheld the Peonage Act but reversed the conviction under the Act on a technicality. 
177. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 75. 
178. 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 880-81. 
179. 9 Id. 
180. 235 U.S. 133 (1914). 
181. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 75. 
182. Id. at 86. 
183. Id. at 88. Klarman points to letters and NAACP files reporting coercive labor practices 
in various Southern states, as well as a 1921 report by the United States Attorney General on the 
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of these statements are open to question. The fact that some peonage 
continued after Bailey does not mean that, as Klarman contends, Bailey 
“apparently had no effect on the amount of peonage that existed.”184  
 Bailey clearly changed the legal regime in various Southern states. 
After Bailey, Alabama passed a new false pretenses law that “omitted the 
objectionable prima facie clause.”185 Historian Pete Daniel reports that the 
incidence of peonage complaints in Alabama “fell off abruptly after the 
Bailey case.”186 Meanwhile, pending prosecutions under the invalidated 
statute apparently were dropped.187 Arkansas removed its unconstitutional 
false pretenses law from the state code in 1921.188 “Mississippi’s Code of 
1917 included such a statute, but the Revised Code of 1930 did not.”189 The 
North Carolina Supreme Court declared the state’s prima facie clause 
unconstitutional, though the legislature did not delete the law from the state 
code until 1943.190 
 Klarman believes that such formal legal changes had no effect “on the 
ground,” but events in Florida suggest otherwise. Florida initially dropped 
its prima facie evidence clause to comply with Bailey, but then reenacted a 
statute with this clause in 1919.191 While this means that Bailey was 
ineffective in Florida, it also may contradict Klarman’s view that peonage 
laws were superfluous to the coercion of black labor. Laws are sometimes 
passed for symbolic or expressive reasons, but the addition of a prima facie 
clause to a false pretenses statute probably does not fall within that category 
of laws. The prima facie clause could also have been enacted proactively by 
the legislature to please planters by showing an interest in their affairs, even 
if the planters saw little need for such a law. But the more plausible 
explanation for the reemergence of the clause is that planters’ ability to 
successfully prosecute workers for failing to pay their debts made a 
 
persistence of peonage in Georgia. Id. Indeed, the Georgia Supreme Court ignored Bailey and 
upheld Georgia’s false pretenses law on the ground that the Georgia statute, unlike the Alabama 
statute invalidated in Bailey, allowed the defendant to “make a statement,” though not testify 
under oath, before the jury. See Wilson v. State, 75 S.E. 619 (Ga. 1912). The Supreme Court 
invalidated Georgia’s law in 1942. See Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942). 
184. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 96. Alexander Bickel and Benno Schmidt point out that 
Alabama employers must have thought that pre-Bailey peonage laws were significant, “since it 
would otherwise be hard to account for the legislature’s tenacity in amending the statute 
repeatedly to get around the state courts’ aversion to criminal liability for breach.” 9 BICKEL & 
SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 900. 
185. COHEN, supra note 81, at 292-93. 
186. PETE DANIEL, THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: PEONAGE IN THE SOUTH, 1901-1969, at 145 
(1972). 
187. 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 872. 
188. COHEN, supra note 81, at 293. 
189. Id. (italics omitted). 
190. Id. 
191. See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 13 (1944) (reviewing the history of the clause and 
invalidating the statute). 
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significant difference with respect to the planters’ ability to coerce blacks. 
In any event, Klarman does not address the issue.  
In general, a small risk of incarceration for engaging in illegal peonage 
likely deterred some plantation owners from engaging in that practice— 
very preliminary investigations, after all, were enough to frighten some 
planters into murdering witnesses.192 The somewhat greater risk of criminal 
prosecution and eventual exoneration by a jury had its own deterrent effect, 
given the uncertainty, legal costs, and shame of a trial.  
As Klarman notes, while Bailey upheld federal law banning peonage 
for debt, there was no federal law banning involuntary servitude as such. 
Nevertheless, one cannot assume that every planter who was willing to 
force a black employee convicted of fraud to work off a debt would have 
been willing and able to simply enslave his workers. The former scenario 
had a far greater air of legitimacy, and, as with all other forms of human 
behavior, the level of brutality planters were willing to engage in no doubt 
varied from one individual to another.193 While there is no way to precisely 
measure such things, the fact that Bailey made it more difficult to 
externalize the costs of enforcing coercive labor practices seems to have 
accelerated a decline in peonage throughout most of the Deep South.194 
In addition to their connection to the collective action problems faced 
by planters who sought to cartelize the labor market, the peonage cases 
provide support for both the cost externalization and cost minimization 
 
192. See DANIEL, supra note 186, at 133-38 (recounting a case of murder provoked by a 
desire to avoid prosecution for peonage); GREGORY A. FREEMAN, LAY THIS BODY DOWN: THE 
1921 MURDERS OF ELEVEN PLANTATION SLAVES (1999); KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 88. 
193. See, e.g., Cotton Hands That Stay, 82 THE COUNTRY GENTLEMAN 21 (1917) 
(describing the labor practices of various Mississippi planters and concluding that while precise 
management techniques vary, successful planters are “firm, just, men who take a friendly interest 
in the personal welfare of the negro”). [LE: check] 
194. One expert concludes that “it would be misleading to imply that little had changed in the 
South since 1865, or even since 1911. From the time of Bailey v. Alabama, and probably earlier, 
involuntary servitude in the South was in decline.” COHEN, supra note 81, at 292. Cohen points 
out that “[i]n the decade 1910-1920, Mississippi lost over 15 percent of its black population.” Id. 
at 297. Between 1920 and 1930, South Carolina lost roughly thirty percent of its black population. 
And these numbers reflect net out-migration, not total out-migration. As Cohen notes, “Numbers 
of that magnitude are simply inconsistent with a picture of the South as a vast jail.” Id. at 297. 
Pete Daniel suggests throughout his book on peonage that labor conditions for southern blacks 
were as bad in the 1920s as they were twenty years earlier. He notes anecdotal evidence that those 
who investigated peonage in rural areas in the 1920s found it to be widespread. “Widespread” is a 
subjective and relative term, one that does not lend itself to easy empirical comparison to earlier 
periods. Meanwhile, Daniel concedes that one objective measure of peonage—the number of 
complaints about the practice—was lower in the 1920s than it had been twenty years earlier. 
DANIEL, supra note 186, at 148. 
  Klarman makes the somewhat mysterious concession that “[b]lack mobility and the 
competitive market for agricultural labor limited coercive possibilities.” KLARMAN, supra note 5, 
at 88. But the whole point of the coercive practices was to limit labor mobility. If there was a great 
deal of labor mobility, it shows that coercive practices, including unlawful peonage post-Bailey, 
were not effective. 
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theories of judicial impact.195 Obviously, white planters had a strong 
interest in externalizing the cost of peonage enforcement to the criminal 
justice system, paid for by all taxpayers, rather than by the planters alone. 
In addition, public enforcement may have served to minimize the total costs 
of maintaining the peonage system by freeing planters from the necessity of 
using relatively costlier and riskier enforcement methods, such as private 
violence. 
C. McCabe v. Atchison 
Klarman portrays McCabe’s dictum requiring roughly equal railroad 
allocations for blacks and whites, regardless of levels of demand from each 
group,196 as a case in which the Court simply followed clear law.197 Yet 
compared to the peonage laws at issue in Bailey and Reynolds, the law at 
issue in McCabe was less clearly legally problematic. Plessy v. Ferguson 
had held that “reasonable” railroad segregation laws were permitted. In the 
context of the times, many people would not have thought it unreasonable 
for a train company operating under a segregation law to refuse to provide 
separate first class cars when market demand for such accommodations did 
not justify the supply. Moreover, in Cumming v. Richmond County Board of 
Education, the Supreme Court had unanimously upheld the provision of a 
public high school for whites but not for blacks, largely on the grounds that 
the inequality at issue was reasonable under the circumstances.198 As further 
evidence that McCabe’s dicta was not obviously compelled, four Justices 
concurred without opinion, likely because they agreed with the substantive 
holding (that the plaintiffs lacked standing) but did not want to associate 
themselves with the decision’s equalitarian dicta.199 
Klarman notes that despite Plessy and Cumming the common 
understanding in the legal world was that, under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, segregation laws had to require equal accommodations for 
both races.200 But despite Klarman’s protestations to the contrary,201 it is 
hard not to see the McCabe dicta as an important shift in the Court’s views 
on the constitutional limits of segregation, especially because the opinion 
emphasized that equal protection with regard to racial classification was a 
 
195. See supra Sections II.B-C. 
196. 235 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1914). 
197. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 62, 77-78. 
198. 175 U.S. 528 (1899). 
199. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 78. Andrew Kull argues, based on a memo from Justice 
Hughes to Justice Holmes, that Holmes would have upheld the law on the merits had the Court 
reached the issue. ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 136-37 (1992). 
200. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 77. 
201. Id. at 78. 
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personal right. Unlike in nonracial contexts, this right apparently could not 
be easily overridden by a showing that the classification at issue was a 
reasonable one with regard to one’s group, regardless of one’s idiosyncratic 
characteristics and claims.202 While the Court was not yet prepared to 
challenge the general structure of Jim Crow, McCabe “implied that laws 
requiring segregation were constitutionally disfavored,”203 a rather 
significant shift given the climate of the times. 
On the other hand, McCabe is consistent with Klarman’s theory that 
while the Supreme Court will rein in jurisdictions that fail to adhere to 
national norms, it is rarely in the forefront of social change. Before 
McCabe, most Southern states explicitly required that separate 
accommodations be equal; only four states allowed unequal luxury 
accommodations.204 The McCabe Court had no intention of challenging the 
basic edifices of Jim Crow, and the Court continued to uphold segregation 
laws in the 1920s and 1930s.205 
Nevertheless, the decision marked a large step forward in the Court’s 
equal protection jurisprudence.206 Once the NAACP had the resources and 
strategic vision to challenge the unequal provision of public schooling for 
blacks, NAACP attorneys relied on McCabe in support of litigation 
requiring Southern states to provide equal graduate school education for 
blacks.207 Indeed, the Court’s ruling in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada,208 requiring that a black student be provided with state-funded 
legal education, either through admission to the University of Missouri or 
creation of a separate but equal law school for blacks, explicitly relied on 
McCabe.209 
 
202. See KULL, supra note 199, at 137-38. See also Andrew Kull, Post-Plessy, Pre-Brown: 
“Logical Exactness” in Enforcing Equal Rights, 24 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 155, 164-167 (1999). 
203. KULL, supra note 199, at 138. 
204. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 78. 
205. Id. 
206. See WELKE, supra note 110, at 355 (“[T]he Court’s recognition that the right to equality 
did not depend on it being economical to provide equal accommodations that were separate laid a 
critical foundation for future constitutional challenges by African-Americans.”). 
207. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 149-50. 
208. 305 U.S. 337 (1938). McReynolds, who was in the minority in McCabe, not surprisingly 
dissented in Gaines. 
209. Id. at 350-51. Perhaps, given social, political, demographic, and economic changes in 
the ensuing years, the school cases would have come out the same way even if the McCabe 
majority had not included strong equalitarian dicta, or even if it had ruled that the denial of equal 
accommodations was reasonable under the circumstances. But Gaines was decided in 1938, well 
before the quantum shift in race relations following World War II that Klarman identifies. This 
suggests that the Court’s willingness to uphold the individual rights of blacks was at least partially 
a product of legal doctrine. And surely, given its extremely limited resources, the NAACP would 
have been less likely to have pursued public education cases to begin with if it had not been aware 
of McCabe’s statement that facilities provided to whites under a Jim Crow regime must also be 
provided to blacks. 
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Klarman asserts that McCabe seems to have “had no effect on railroad 
accommodations for southern blacks.”210 The Court said that state law 
should not authorize inequality; if railroads nevertheless provided unequal 
accommodations, black passengers only had recourse to the common law or 
state statutes requiring separate but equal facilities. By the 1910s, blacks, 
recognizing that state courts were inhospitable to these suits, had generally 
stopped filing them. However, contrary to what Klarman implies,211 there 
do seem to have been occasional successful lawsuits.212 
McCabe, then, had an only marginal effect on black railroad 
passengers. However, it does seem to have had long-term effects on the 
legal status of unequal public education. 
D. Buchanan v. Warley 
1. Buchanan and the Rise and Fall of Housing Segregation Laws 
Starting in 1910, many cities in the South, border states, and lower 
Midwest, responding to a wave of unwanted African-American in-
migration from rural areas,213 passed laws mandating residential segregation 
in housing.214 As Klarman notes,215 more cities were ready to follow suit if 
 
210. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 89. 
211. Id. 
212. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Redmond, 81 So. 115 (Miss. 1919). Redmond was a 
victorious lawsuit brought by a black railroad passenger who was denied equal accommodations. 
Among other things, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that if a railroad provides white 
passengers with separate toilet facilities for men and women, it must do so for black passengers as 
well. For another example of a successful lawsuit over unequal conditions, see David S. Bogen, 
Precursors of Rosa Parks: Maryland Transportation Cases Between the Civil War and World 
War I, 63 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2004) (manuscript at 22-23 & 30 n.102, on file with 
authors). [LE: check] 
213. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 79. 
214. See Roger L. Rice, Residential Segregation by Law, 1910-1917, 34 J.S. HIST. 179, 180-
83 (1968). Klarman reports that Baltimore; several Virginia cities; Winston-Salem, North 
Carolina; Greenville, South Carolina; Louisville; and Atlanta all enacted segregation ordinances 
in the 1910s. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 79. Other scholars have identified residential segregation 
laws passed at this time in Asheville, North Carolina; Ashland, Clifton Forge, Richmond, Norfolk, 
Portsmouth, and Roanoke, Virginia; Oklahoma City; St. Louis; Madisonville, Kentucky; 
Mooresville, North Carolina; Tulsa; and Port Arthur, Texas. 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 
103, at 791; ALFRED L. BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RIOT OF 
1921, at 84-85 (2002) (discussing the Tulsa segregation law); MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A 
NEW SOCIETY: PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900-1933, at 265-66 (1994); 
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 41 (1993); Christopher 
Silver, The Racial Origins of Zoning: Southern Cities from 1910-40, 6 PLAN. PERSP. 189, 192-93 
(1991); Charles E. Wynes, The Evolution of Jim Crow Laws in Twentieth Century Virginia, 28 
PHYLON 416, 418 (1967); Posting of Steve Reich, to http://www.h-
net.msu.edu/~south/archives/threads/segregation.html (Feb. 22, 1996) (discussing Port Arthur’s 
segregation ordinance). Undoubtedly, other as-yet-unidentified Southern and border-state cities 
also enacted residential segregation laws. 
215. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 90. 
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the laws were found to be constitutional.216 But for the intervention of the 
Supreme Court, residential segregation by law would likely have become 
nearly universal in the South and perhaps have spread to the North as well. 
Louisville’s residential segregation ordinance prohibited “any colored 
person to move into and occupy as a residence . . . any house upon any 
block upon which a greater number of houses are occupied . . . by white 
people than are occupied . . . by colored people.”217 The opposite restriction 
applied to whites.218 In Buchanan v. Warley in 1917, the Supreme Court 
unanimously ruled that Louisville’s law was unconstitutional. The Court 
reasoned that the law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by infringing on the right to own and alienate property without 
a valid police power rationale. 
After the Supreme Court upheld a general (nonracial) zoning ordinance 
in 1926,219 another wave of residential segregation laws swept the South. 
The NAACP, relying on Buchanan, persuaded the Supreme Court to 
invalidate segregation ordinances in New Orleans220 and Richmond.221 
Local branches of the NAACP successfully challenged laws passed in 
Winston-Salem, Baltimore, Indianapolis, Norfolk, and Dallas.222 By the 
1930s, residential segregation laws were rare223 and clearly 
unconstitutional. 
2. Buchanan as a Civil Rights Decision 
Klarman acknowledges that Buchanan “was not constitutional 
minimalism.”224 The Supreme Court was certainly not bound by precedent 
to invalidate residential segregation laws. The segregation precedent most 
 
216. Charlotte; Charleston; New Orleans; and Meridian, Mississippi are among the cities 
known to have considered passing residential segregation laws. Silver, supra note 214, at 193. See 
Silver, supra note 214, at 191 (discussing the consideration of a residential segregation law in 
Richmond, Virginia, before the Supreme Court ruled that such laws were unconstitutional).  
217. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 70-71 (1917). 
218. Id. at 71.  
219. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
220. Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927) (per curiam). 
221. City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930) (per curiam). 
222. See VOSE, supra note 146, at 51-52 (discussing various successful challenges of 
segregation ordinances brought by the NAACP). 
223. See id. at 52. Despite the general demise of residential segregation ordinances, 
Brooksville, Florida passed a law as late as 1948 requiring all black residents to live in the 
southern part of town. Dan DeWitt, Racism’s Remnant, ST. PETERSBURG (Fla.) TIMES, Feb. 22, 
1998, at 1. The law was not invalidated until 1972. Id. A 1944 Birmingham residential segregation 
law was invalidated in 1949. Monk v. City of Birmingham, 87 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Ala. 1949), 
aff’d, 185 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1950). A state court invalidated a Winston-Salem ordinance in 1940. 
See Major Gardner, Note, Race Segregation in Cities, 29 KY. L.J. 213, 213 (1941). Oklahoma 
City passed a residential segregation law in 1934, which survived a court challenge because the 
complaint was flawed. Jones v. Oklahoma City, 78 F.2d 860, 861 (10th Cir. 1935). 
224. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 80. 
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obviously relevant to Buchanan, Plessy v. Ferguson, held that segregation 
was a valid police power function, and the Plessy opinion was infused with 
pseudo-scientific racist assumptions. Moreover, elite legal opinion strongly 
supported the constitutionality of residential segregation. Both before and 
after Buchanan, law review authors consistently argued that residential 
segregation ordinances passed constitutional muster.225 
The Court’s opinion in Buchanan, therefore, seems anomalous and 
presents something of a mystery. Like many other commentators,226 
Klarman argues that the mystery unravels once it is understood that 
Buchanan was mostly about property rights, not civil rights. Undoubtedly, 
property rights played an important role in the decision, as it allowed the 
Court to distinguish Buchanan from Plessy.227 African Americans did not 
have a common law right to sit with whites on trains, so the Plessy Court 
held that the interest in doing so was a social right unprotected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.228 By contrast, blacks clearly had a Fourteenth 
Amendment right to purchase and occupy property. 
To this extent, Klarman is correct that Buchanan was a property rights 
decision. However, Klarman ignores the most significant aspect of the 
Buchanan opinion: the Court’s refusal to concede that laws enforcing 
segregation were within the scope of the police power.229 In addition to 
relegating railroad seating to the realm of social rights, Plessy had 
suggested that any “reasonable” segregation regulations would be proper 
exercises of the police power and had applied a rather lax and racism-
infused standard of reasonableness. In contrast, after noting that property 
rights are subject to the police power, the Buchanan opinion [ME: block 
quote] “moves immediately into the antidiscrimination litany that no 
Supreme Court majority had [in]voked since Strauder: the Reconstruction 
Amendments; the Slaughter-House Cases as the great expositor of the 
amendments’ central purpose; Strauder itself, with its famous 
antidiscrimination passages quoted at length; Ex parte Virginia; and the 
 
225. Id. 
226. See 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 811-12 (recounting the views of those 
who think that Buchanan was purely a property rights decision); KULL, supra note 199, at 139 
(“The usual explanation for how it came about that the Supreme Court should vote unanimously 
to strike down a segregation ordinance in 1917 . . . is that Buchanan is essentially a decision in 
defense of property rights.”). 
227. Carol Rose, Property Stories: Shelley v. Kraemer, in PROPERTY STORIES 169, 174 
(Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2004) (noting that the Court distinguished 
Buchanan from Plessy on the basis of the former’s focus on the right to own and dispose of 
property). 
228. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
229. Cf. Mark Tushnet, Plessy v. Ferguson in Libertarian Perspective, 16 LAW & PHIL. 245, 
258 (1997) (“[T]he desire to create a segregated society was patent, and the Court simply refused 
to entertain it as a permissible legislative goal.”). 
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1866 and 1870 Civil Rights Acts for good measure.”230 The Court 
emphasized that “[c]olored persons are citizens of the United States and 
have the right to purchase property and enjoy and use the same without 
laws discriminating against them solely on account of color.”231 
The Court then proceeded to explicitly reject all of the police power 
rationales that Kentucky argued supported state-enforced segregation, 
including limiting interracial friction, preventing miscegenation, and 
preventing the depreciation in the value of property owned by white people 
when African Americans became their neighbors. The Buchanan Court 
ruled that blacks could not be deprived of their property rights on such 
bases.232 
The Court’s refusal to defer to Kentucky’s assertion of its police power 
is remarkable for several reasons. First, as noted previously, the 1910s 
represented the worst period of post-Civil War racism in American history. 
Second, the Court had to go out of its way to distinguish Plessy and was not 
entirely persuasive in doing so. As Klarman notes, “After Plessy, one could 
argue that segregation plainly qualified as . . . a reasonable police-power 
objective . . . .”233 Buchanan was “a flat repudiation of the vague and 
flaccid Plessy standard of reasonableness as the governing constitutional 
sanction for legalized racism.”234 Third, by the 1910s, Progressive 
advocates of “sociological jurisprudence” so dominated mainstream legal 
thought that Charles Warren remarked that “any court which recognizes 
wide and liberal bounds to the State police power is to be deemed in touch 
with the temper of the times.”235 Fourth, the Supreme Court had recently 
 
230. KULL, supra note 199, at 139-40; see also 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 799 
(stating that the opinion “introduced an abrupt shift of tone and perspective . . . from the entire 
corpus of Jim Crow law that had grown out of Plessy v. Ferguson”). 
231. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78-79 (1917). Klarman fails to summarize the legal 
reasoning in Buchanan, much less directly quote from it. It seems nearly impossible to read the 
opinion closely and maintain that the underlying basis of the decision was solely protection of 
property rights without consideration of the rights of blacks. The best one can say for the contrary 
argument is that some of the Justices who joined the opinion—Holmes and McReynolds are likely 
suspects, the former because he drafted an undelivered dissent and the latter because of his 
racism—likely did not approve of Justice Day’s emphasis on blacks’ rights. 
232. As Bickel and Schmidt argue, “The decision should be read as a recognition, in 1917, 
that black people could claim basic rights of personhood and autonomy as those concepts were 
then understood.” 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 989. 
233. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 24. Indeed, just before the Court decided Buchanan, the 
Georgia Supreme Court held that residential segregation laws were constitutional as reasonable 
exercises of the police power because they would prevent race friction, disorder, and violence. 
Harden v. City of Atlanta, 93 S.E. 401, 402-03 (Ga. 1917). 
234. 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 814. 
235. Charles Warren, A Bulwark to the State Police Power—the United States Supreme 
Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 667, 668 (1913). Warren prefaced this remark by noting that “[u]nder 
the present prevailing anti-individualism, there can be no doubt that the test of the progressiveness 
of a court is the degree of remoteness of the line fixed, within which the legislature shall have 
scope to legislate without being held to infringe on the Constitution.” Id. 
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expressed sympathy for nonracial zoning, based on Progressive precepts 
that could also be applied to racial zoning,236 and Jim Crow racial 
segregation itself was part of a broader pattern of state regulation that was 
broadly Progressive in nature.237 And, fifth, although Buchanan was 
decided during the Lochner era, and the Court no longer simply deferred to 
claimed state exercises of the police power, during the 1910s the Court 
almost always upheld state regulatory legislation as valid exercises of the 
police power.238 In 1917, the year Buchanan was decided, the Court upheld 
several controversial regulatory laws.239 
Klarman also argues that Buchanan was mostly a victory for property 
rights, not civil rights, because “three of the five southern courts that 
considered the issue had invalidated residential segregation ordinances. 
Though the precise holding varied, these decisions consistently emphasized 
owners’ rights to sell property unimpeded by government regulation.”240 
The high courts of Georgia,241 Maryland,242 and North Carolina243 did 
indeed invalidate racial segregation ordinances. However, by 1917 the 
Georgia Supreme Court had reversed itself and upheld a revised residential 
segregation law. It distinguished its previous holding by narrowly 
 
236. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915). 
237. WELKE, supra note 110, at 351-52. 
238. See MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND REALITY (2001); David E. 
Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights 
Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism]; David 
E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX L. REV. 1 (2003). 
239. Klarman acknowledges that the specific holding of Lochner itself was silently overruled 
in 1917 in Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917), but adds that the Court issued a Lochnerian 
decision that same year invalidating a law banning employment agencies in Adams v. Tanner, 244 
U.S. 590 (1917). Klarman, supra note 5, at 81. Klarman, however, neglects other deferential 
decisions the same year. See Stettler v. O’Hara, 243 U.S. 629 (1917) (per curiam) (upholding in a 
4-4 vote, with Progressive Justice Brandeis recused, a minimum wage law for women); Mountain 
Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917) (upholding a statute that required that employees 
be compensated from a pool into which all employers in an industry had to contribute); N.Y. Cent. 
R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) (unanimously upholding the constitutionality of workers’ 
compensation laws); Bowersock v. Smith, 243 U.S. 29 (1917) (upholding a statute eliminating the 
fellow servant rule and the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk). Many of 
these decisions split the Court, but one can hardly say that in 1917 the Court was aggressively 
limiting the states’ exercise of their police powers. 
  In Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917), the Court upheld a federal law limiting the 
hours of railroad workers to eight and prohibiting the railroads from reducing pay to make up for 
the shorter hours. Justice Day, the author of Buchanan, dissented in Wilson, arguing that the law 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Klarman, supra note 5, at 81. This 
shows that Day was not a strict opponent of Lochnerian jurisprudence. Klarman raises this dissent 
to buttress his claim that Buchanan was primarily a property rights decision. However, as 
explained above, the facts that Buchanan involved the invocation of property rights and that all 
the Justices believed that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protected property 
rights to some degree, did not dictate the outcome of the police power issue. 
240. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 81. 
241. Carey v. City of Atlanta, 84 S.E. 456 (Ga. 1915). 
242. State v. Gurry, 88 A. 546 (Md. 1913). 
243. State v. Darnell, 81 S.E. 338 (N.C. 1914). 
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interpreting the holding as invalidating the law in question only because it 
applied retroactively.244 The Maryland opinion, meanwhile, was expressly 
limited to protecting vested rights. Finally, the North Carolina case, though 
broader in its dicta than the other two, held that the law in question violated 
the general welfare clause of a city charter, not that it violated the Federal 
Constitution. Meanwhile, the Virginia245 and Kentucky246 high courts had 
upheld residential segregation laws. By the time Buchanan was decided, 
then, no state had ruled that a residential segregation law that did not apply 
to vested rights exceeded the states’ police power, and three state courts 
explicitly had held that it did not.247 
3. Buchanan’s Underrated Impact 
As Klarman notes, contemporary civil rights activists hailed Buchanan 
as a momentous decision, and some modern commentators have followed 
suit.248 Buchanan was the NAACP’s first major victory before the United 
States Supreme Court, and Klarman acknowledges that Buchanan likely 
was important in energizing the NAACP and inspiring civil rights activism 
by encouraging blacks to “believe the racial status quo was malleable.”249 
However, Klarman concludes that Buchanan was otherwise 
inconsequential. First, he disagrees with those commentators who believe 
that the decision inhibited state and local governments from passing more 
pervasive and brutal segregation laws, akin to those enacted in South 
Africa.250 Second, Klarman asserts that Buchanan “had little or no effect on 
 
244. Harden v. City of Atlanta, 93 S.E. 401 (Ga. 1917). 
245. Hopkins v. City of Richmond, 86 S.E. 139 (Va. 1915). 
246. Harris v. City of Louisville, 177 S.W. 472 (Ky. 1915), rev’d, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 
U.S. 60 (1917). 
247. Klarman further contends that the Louisville segregation law was such an obvious 
infringement on property rights that “[e]ven the committed majoritarian, Holmes, could not 
countenance such a substantial interference with property rights.” KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 82. 
Yet Holmes drafted a dissenting opinion, arguing that the white plaintiff (who was barred from 
selling his property to a black man) could not assert the rights of blacks disadvantaged by the 
statute, and that the law did not infringe on the plaintiff’s property rights in a way that violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 592 illus. (providing a 
copy of Holmes’s undelivered dissent in Buchanan). Only eleven days before Buchanan was 
released, Holmes was still debating whether to issue his dissent. Id. at 805 n.255. He ultimately 
did not, probably not because he changed his mind on the merits but because he could not get a 
second vote. Id. 
248. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 90, 93-94. 
249. Id. at 94. 
250. Id. at 93; see, e.g., JOHN R. HOWARD, THE SHIFTING WIND: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
CIVIL RIGHTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO BROWN 192 (1999) (suggesting that the wave of 
residential segregation laws passed in the South in the 1910s “can be seen as a formal step toward 
a system of apartheid”); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., De Jure Housing Segregation in the 
United States and South Africa: The Difficult Pursuit for Racial Justice, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 763, 
770 (concluding that if Buchanan had come out the other way, in “many southern states and 
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segregated housing patterns, and neither did the two summary affirmances 
in the interwar years,”251 and that the invalidation of segregation laws had 
little effect on residential patterns.252 
With regard to Klarman’s first point, the evidence is inconclusive. On 
the one hand, as Klarman points out, Buchanan clearly did not lead to a 
rollback of de jure segregation, or even stop its extension “to new areas of 
life, such as restaurants, parks, and barbershops, and to new technologies, 
such as office elevators, taxicabs, and buses.”253 An underfunded NAACP 
could barely keep up with challenges to clearly unconstitutional residential 
segregation ordinances that cities continued to enact, much less attempt to 
expand Buchanan’s holding.254 
On the other hand, Jim Crow in the South never came close to matching 
the apartheid system in South Africa, with its stringent restrictions on black 
residence and migration. Perhaps, as Klarman implies, political, social, and 
economic forces would have prevented such developments regardless of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Buchanan. But perhaps a contrary ruling in 
Buchanan would have emboldened racist political interests to launch a 
broader legal attack on blacks before such forces coalesced. NAACP 
founder Oswald Garrison Villard warned in 1913 that, if upheld, residential 
segregation laws would be a first step in a series of broader antiblack 
measures.255 Indeed, to get an idea of where things might have gone, one 
need only consider that agitation for the complete segregation of blacks and 
whites in the rural South was fairly prominent in the 1910s,256 and Winston-
Salem seriously considered segregating white- and black-owned businesses 
in 1912, shortly after it segregated housing.257 
 
perhaps many other parts of America” the living conditions of black Americans could have been 
“almost akin to that of black South Africans” under apartheid). 
251. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 159. 
252. Id. at 143. 
253. Id. at 93. 
254. Also, Mark Tushnet suggests that the NAACP, allied with Progressives on many issues, 
was not comfortable about pursuing its civil rights agenda through a property rights paradigm. 
Mark Tushnet, Laying the Groundwork: From Plessy to Brown 11-12 (n.d.) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with authors). 
255. See OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD, SEGREGATION IN BALTIMORE AND WASHINGTON: 
AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE BALTIMORE BRANCH OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, OCTOBER 20, 1913, at 2, 7 (1913). [LE: bring to 
OP] 
256. See 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 791-94; Jeffrey J. Crow, An Apartheid for 
the South: Clarence Poe’s Crusade for Rural Segregation, in RACE, CLASS, AND POLITICS IN 
SOUTHERN HISTORY 216, 217-18 (Jeffrey J. Crow et al. eds., 1989). 
257. Michael E. Daly & John Wertheimer, State v. William Darnell: The Battle over De Jure 
Housing Segregation in Progressive Era Winston-Salem, in WARM ASHES: ISSUES IN SOUTHERN 
HISTORY AT THE DAWN OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 255, 271 n.29 (Winfred B. Moore, Jr. 
et al. eds., 2003). 
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While Buchanan did not change the Court’s acquiescence to the 
segregation of public spaces, it made clear that Jim Crow had its legal 
limits. W.E.B. Du Bois, in fact, credited Buchanan with “the breaking of 
the backbone of segregation.”258 More recently, Judge Leon Higginbotham 
argued that “Buchanan was of profound importance in applying a brake to 
decelerate what would have been run-away racism in the United States.”259 
Given the counterfactual nature of the inquiry, one cannot say with any 
certainty who has the better of the argument, but one can say that 
Klarman’s confidence in his position that Buchanan did not inhibit broader 
anti-black measures seems unwarranted. 
Another important aspect of Buchanan, one not previously emphasized 
by scholars (though related to the apartheid conjecture), is that the Court 
clearly enforced blacks’ right to own and alienate property.260 The right to 
property not only improved blacks’ economic status, but also gave 
property- and business-owning Southern blacks some economic autonomy 
from local whites, which allowed them to play leading roles in the civil 
rights movement.261 But for Buchanan, it is possible that the property rights 
of blacks would ultimately have come under legal threat, at least in the 
more reactionary parts of the South. 
As for Klarman’s second point that Buchanan had little if any effect on 
segregated housing patterns, he is generally correct.262 Indeed, “residential 
 
258. 1 W.E.B. DUBOIS, W.E.B. DUBOIS SPEAKS: SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES 1890-1919, at 
52 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1970). 
259. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND 
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 126 (1996); see also HOWARD, supra note 
250, at 193 (“Given the underlying logic of segregation there was no inherent limit to the racial 
structuring of social life. The legal premises justifying segregation yielded arguments for the total 
racial structuring of society.”). 
260.  While many blacks remained poor and essentially assetless during the Jim Crow era, 
others managed to accumulate sufficient property to give them middle-class status or, far more 
rarely, wealth. See, e.g., JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SELF-HELP AMONG 
BLACK AMERICANS: A RECONSIDERATION OF RACE AND ECONOMICS (1991); GLENDA 
ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER AND JIM CROW: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF WHITE 
SUPREMACY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1896-1920 (1996). [AU: Please give pincite for Gilmore.] 
Especially in isolated rural areas, this property was at risk from white violence (“whitecapping”). 
See AUGUST MEIER, NEGRO THOUGHT IN AMERICA, 1880-1915: RACIAL IDEOLOGIES IN THE 
AGE OF BOOKER T. WASHINGTON 106 (1963) (explaining that whitecappers would attack 
business establishments owned by African Americans and drive their proprietors out of town); 
Holmes, supra note 103. Moreover, the livelihoods of many middle class blacks were constantly 
under threat from Progressive labor laws that benefited racist labor unions. See BERNSTEIN, supra 
note 170, at 44-46, 51-53, 61-65, 69-71, 80 (2001). But blacks’ right to own property was never 
seriously threatened by law. 
261. See, e.g., David Beito & Linda Royster Beito, ‘The Most Hated, and Best Loved, Negro 
in Mississippi’: The Life of T.R.M. Howard (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) 
(discussing the civil rights activism of Dr. Howard, a wealthy African-American physician in 
Mississippi). [AU: the title is not on the manuscript. Please provide either title page of 
manuscript, or confirmation from authors] 
262. Cf. DAVID DELANEY, RACE, PLACE, AND THE LAW, 1836-1948, at 147 (1998) (noting 
that Buchanan “by no means entailed the dismantling of racial residential segregation”). 
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segregation dramatically increased in the 1910s and 1920s” despite 
Buchanan, as blacks poured into cities in both the North and South.263 The 
significance of Buchanan should not be exaggerated; a decision 
invalidating de jure segregation could not, and indeed did not purport to, 
overcome private preferences that inevitably led to pervasive housing 
segregation throughout urban America.264 
However, scholars who argue for Buchanan’s practical significance do 
not claim that the decision affected segregation levels.265 Rather, they argue 
that Buchanan impeded the efforts of urban whites to prevent blacks from 
“colonizing” white neighborhoods, both in the South and the North. The 
black urban population in the United States almost doubled between 1910 
and 1929,266 and continued to grow in later years. In certain cities, the 
growth was far more dramatic; roughly six thousand blacks lived in Detroit 
in 1910, compared to approximately one hundred and twenty thousand in 
1930.267 In the absence of residential segregation laws, “[a]s the black 
population continued to grow in a given city . . . some expansion of the 
black-occupied area was inevitable; and attempts to prevent it sooner or 
later collapsed.”268 But if Buchanan had permitted racial zoning, many 
potential black migrants to cities would literally have had nowhere to go. 
They either would have been forced to stay in rural areas or been shunted 
off to the undeveloped suburban periphery of cities. Either result would 
have been disastrous for black welfare.269 Not only did cities provide more 
economic opportunity for blacks, but, as Klarman himself points out, the 
 
263. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 91. In a few Southern cities, such as Charleston, Savannah, 
New Orleans, and Little Rock, traditional black and white residential intermingling continued. 
Even in those cities, segregation increased, KENNETH L. KUSMER, A GHETTO TAKES SHAPE: 
BLACK CLEVELAND, 1870-1930, at 173 (1976), though not to the extent it would have if 
Buchanan had upheld residential segregation laws. On the other hand, Michael Daly and John 
Wertheimer point out that Winston-Salem’s segregation law, had it survived, would have frozen 
housing patterns at a relatively integrated level, ultimately creating all-white and all-black blocks, 
but also requiring the continued integration of neighborhoods. Instead, “blacks flowed into East 
Winston, and whites flowed out,” eventually leading to Winston-Salem becoming the second-
most segregated city in the United States. Daly & Wertheimer, supra note 257, at 266. 
264. Thomas Schelling explains that even if most whites and most blacks prefer to live in 
integrated neighborhoods, if both blacks and whites prefer to live in neighborhoods where their 
group is a majority, there will be no integrated neighborhoods. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, Sorting 
and Mixing: Race and Sex, in MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 135 (1978). During the Jim 
Crow era, of course, most whites did not want to live in integrated neighborhoods. 
265. E.g., James W. Ely Jr., Book Review, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 293, 294 (2000) (praising 
Buchanan, but stating that “no decision by the Supreme Court could undo the host of legal devices 
and informal arrangements that su[s]tained racially separate housing”). 
266. Arthur T. Martin, Segregation of Residences of Negroes, 32 MICH. L. REV. 721, 723 
(1934). 
267. Id. at 724. 
268. HIGGS, supra note 82, at 116. 
269. See James W. Ely, Jr., Reflections On Buchanan v. Warley, Property Rights, and Race, 
51 VAND. L. REV. 953, 955 (1998). 
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migration of blacks to cities, North and South, was a crucial element in the 
ultimate victory of the civil rights movement. Among other advantages, it 
enabled blacks to increase their political power by moving to areas where 
they could vote.270 
Klarman never directly addresses the potential effect of residential 
segregation ordinances on black migration patterns. However, he asserts 
that segregation ordinances were unnecessary to maintain segregated 
housing,271 so he likely would also argue that segregation ordinances were 
unnecessary to prevent blacks from moving to white neighborhoods. 
Indeed, Klarman, citing an article by Booker T. Washington,272 attributes 
the proliferation of segregation ordinances not to the demands of white 
homeowners seeking to exclude blacks but to “politicians seeking votes.”273 
“A single black family’s entrance into a white neighborhood could rivet 
public attention and create an irresistible opportunity for ambitious 
politicians. Once someone proposed extending segregation to a new sphere 
of life, the incentives of politicians were skewed toward jumping on the 
bandwagon.”274 
One of the authors of this Review has favorably cited Washington’s 
claim as at least a partial explanation for residential segregation laws,275 and 
political entrepreneurship of the sort that Klarman describes has been 
discussed in both theoretical and historical academic literature.276 Yet 
further investigation reveals that Washington was wrong; residential 
segregation laws were not simply political fluff. Examination of the origins 
of segregation laws in Baltimore,277 Louisville,278 St. Louis279 and Winston-
 
270. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 100-02. 
271. Id. at 92. 
272. Booker T. Washington, My View of the Segregation Laws, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 23, 
1915, at 113. 
273. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 92. 
274. Id. 
275. Bernstein, supra note 87, at 834 n.184. 
276. For example, Jennifer Roback shows that politicians successfully promoted mandatory 
segregation of streetcars to attract votes from relatively indifferent but politically dominant 
whites, despite strong opposition from streetcar companies and African Americans. Jennifer 
Roback, The Separation of Race and State, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 58, 63 (1991). Roback 
provides a more general and theoretical explanation of the relationship between political 
entrepreneurship and de jure racism in Jennifer Roback, Racism as Rent Seeking, 27 ECON. 
INQUIRY 661 (1989) (describing the politicization of race by political entrepreneurs). 
277. See VILLARD, supra note 255, at 3 (stating that “the chief motive” underlying the 
segregation law in Baltimore was the “desire to prevent the depreciation of real estate by sales to 
colored people”); W.E.B. Du Bois, Baltimore, in 3 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO 
PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1910-1932, at 23, 23-24 (Herbert Aptheker ed., 1973) (discussing 
the demand for a segregation law in Baltimore after successful blacks began “invading” white 
neighborhoods); Garrett Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation 
Ordinances of 1910-1913, 42 MD. L. REV. 289, 299 (1983) (tracing the origins of Baltimore’s 
segregation law and attributing it to a desire to confine blacks to their existing neighborhoods). 
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Salem280 show that they were enacted in response to the demands of white 
homeowners and real estate investors who sought to keep blacks out of 
white neighborhoods. St. Louis’s residential segregation ordinance not only 
originated from the grass roots, but twenty-three of the twenty-eight city 
aldermen publicly opposed it.281 Supporters instead turned to a referendum. 
The ordinance passed by an overwhelming margin, and “[t]he white wards 
closest to Negro residential areas voted most heavily for the ordinance.”282 
Of course, showing that white homeowners wanted segregation laws 
does not necessarily mean that such laws were needed. Indeed, many 
commentators have argued that restrictive covenants were an almost perfect 
“private” substitute for residential segregation laws.283 But Klarman 
himself, while discussing the effects of Shelley v. Kraemer, aptly sums up 
the academic literature on restrictive covenants as concluding that they 
generally proved “too clumsy and expensive to frustrate powerful 
demographic and economic trends.”284 For example, restrictive covenants 
were not self-enforcing, but required someone to pay the expense of 
litigation to enforce the covenant, creating a massive collective action 
problem.285 
As economist William Fischel explains: 
 
278. See George C. Wright, The NAACP and Residential Segregation in Louisville, Kentucky, 
1914-1917, 78 REG. KY. HIST. SOC’Y 39 (1980). 
279. See Daniel T. Kelleher, St. Louis’ 1916 Residential Segregation Ordinance, 26 BULL. 
MO. HIST. SOC’Y 239 (1970). [LE: Bring to OP.] 
280. Daly & Wertheimer, supra note 257, at 257. 
281. Kelleher, supra note 279, at 242, 245-46. 
282. Id. at 246. The ordinance passed by a three-to-one margin. Blacks cast roughly half of 
the no votes, which means that among white voters the margin favoring residential segregation 
was six to one. Roger N. Baldwin, Negro Segregation by Initiative Election in St. Louis, 14 AM. 
CITY 356 (1916). 
283. E.g., KLUGER, supra note 114, at 120 (claiming that restrictive covenants made 
Buchanan’s ban on residential segregation laws “almost worthless”). 
284. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 262. Indeed, contrary to the general impression that 
restrictive covenants spread only after the Buchanan decision, Winston-Salem whites, for 
example, lobbied for a segregation law precisely because restrictive covenants had proved 
ineffective in restricting black settlement. Daly & Wertheimer, supra note 257, at 257. Restrictive 
covenants were also well known in St. Louis before white residents starting campaigning for 
racial zoning. See Rose, supra note 227, at 181 (noting that the restrictive covenant at issue in 
Shelley v. Kraemer had been signed in 1911). 
285. Ely, supra note 265, at 294 (“Not only did the enforcement of covenants rest upon 
private initiative, but parties had to satisfy highly technical requirements in order to create binding 
limits on land use.”); Rose, supra note 227, at 175 (“Unlike zoning, [racially restrictive 
covenants] required developers and homeowners themselves to bear the costs of creating and 
enforcing legal exclusion; this greater expense undoubtedly discouraged some level of racial 
exclusion and opened up a greater total amount of housing to minority members, even if minority 
residential areas remained segregated as they expanded.”). To overcome the collective action 
problem of enforcing restrictive covenants and externalize the costs to the state, Dallas passed an 
ordinance making the violation of a restrictive covenant agreement a crime. A state court of 
appeals held that the ordinance was unconstitutional. City of Dallas v. Liberty Annex Corp., 19 
S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). 
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Among prejudiced whites, an all-white neighborhood is a 
“public good.” Such a “good” is non-rival and 
non-excludable in consumption. Thus if a black family 
moves into a neighborhood, the well-being of all 
prejudiced whites is reduced, even though they may have 
no direct interaction with the newcomer. Indeed, the only 
person who has an immediate economic interaction with 
the newcomer is the seller who has most likely departed 
herself from the neighborhood or, as a landlady, may not 
live there herself. While a neighboring white homeowner 
might be willing to pay something to blacks to move out of 
his neighborhood, his ability to combine his monetary 
offering with his neighbors’ is complicated by the free rider 
problem of such goods. His white neighbor will think, “If 
he is willing to pay let him. We will both benefit, and I 
won’t have to pay.” Such reasoning would, in situations in 
which no coercive enforcement of collective action is 
possible, often defeat attempts to exclude blacks.286 
If many blacks had already moved in by the time homeowners or 
landlords287 in a “threatened” neighborhood managed to raise funds to 
 
286. William A. Fischel, Why Judicial Reversal of Apartheid Made a Difference, 51 VAND. 
L. REV. 975, 978 (1998). Homeowners lobbying in favor of residential segregation laws also 
faced a collective action problem, but a less severe one. First, the problem only needed to be 
overcome once, whereas covenants would need to be continuously enforced over time. Second, 
politicians will respond to the active lobbying of only a fraction of the relevant population if they 
believe that the activists’ views reflect the views of more passive neighbors, while making and 
effectively enforcing covenants required far more cooperation among neighbors. Third, while few 
white homeowners would have any reason to actively undermine the push for a prospective 
residential segregation law, Fischel notes that 
[i]t is often in the interest of at least a few whites to sell to blacks. Some 
blacks may have a preference for integrated neighborhoods and be willing to 
offer more than whites. Or some white homeowners might anticipate that the 
neighborhood may be about to be integrated, and they may want to sell 
quickly. Excluding all blacks from the market would often mean that 
homeowners who are selling get lower offers for what is usually the largest 
single asset they own. 
Id. at 978-79; see also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 214, at 37 (“The racially segmented 
market generated real estate values in black areas that far exceeded anything in white 
neighborhoods, and this simple economic fact created a great potential for profits along the color 
line, guaranteeing that some real estate agent would specialize in opening up new areas to black 
settlement.”). 
287. Like white homeowners, landlords tried to use restrictive covenants and other private 
agreements to exclude blacks. Osofsky explains, for example, that white landlords in Harlem had 
restrictive covenants on their properties prohibiting them from renting to blacks. However, no 
group was able to get the unified support of white property owners to enforce the covenants. 
Instead, landlords formed block associations, in which all landlords on a given street agreed not to 
rent to blacks. Yet individual landlords consistently shirked on their agreements; white and black 
speculators bought tenements and rented them to blacks to try to force neighbors to repurchase 
them at higher prices. GILBERT OSOFSKY, HARLEM: THE MAKING OF A GHETTO 109 (1966). 
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art9
BERNSTEIN-SOMIN DRAFT FOR OFFICER PROOF 11/5/2004  3:32 PM 
19nn] Desktop Publishing Example 147 
 
“protect” their property, the “changed circumstances” doctrine rendered the 
covenant unenforceable.288 Carol Rose concludes that “[g]iven the patterns 
of neighborhood change in major cities, there doubtless were many [racially 
restrictive covenants] that simply fell apart for lack of enforcement.”289 
In the absence of segregation laws or effective restrictive covenants, 
whites often turned to violence to drive out new black residents from white 
neighborhoods. Violence had a significant advantage over restrictive 
covenants in that only a minority of local whites needed to participate for it 
to be a potentially effective tool against black “interlopers.” Yet such 
violence was neither omnipresent nor fully effective when used. Unlike 
residential segregation laws, which externalized the costs of excluding 
blacks to taxpayers, the costs of engaging in violence were internalized by 
those who engaged in the violence. These costs could be substantial—
violence not only raised the risk of arrest for the perpetrators, but also led to 
the possibility that they would be wounded or killed by blacks acting in 
self-defense.290 
Restrictive covenants and violence did sometimes succeed in excluding 
blacks from white neighborhoods, but they were nowhere near as effective 
as residential segregation laws would have been. Despite white opposition, 
blacks flooded into formerly white neighborhoods in St. Louis,291 East St. 
Louis,292 Chicago,293 and New York.294 Even in the South, where white 
 
“Harlem landlords who adhered to their original restrictive covenants suffered serious economic 
consequences. Many were unable to find white people willing to rent their apartments.” Id. at 110. 
Existing white tenants remained only when rents were reduced drastically. As Osofsky concludes, 
“The opponents of Negro settlement faced the dilemma of maintaining a ‘White Only’ policy and 
probably losing everything, or renting to Negroes at higher prices and surviving. Most chose what 
seemed to them the lesser of two evils.” Id. 
288. See Rose, supra note 227, at 188-89 (discussing the “changed circumstances” doctrine in 
the context of restrictive covenants). 
289. Id. at 182. 
290. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 133-34 (discussing the case of Dr. Ossian Sweet). See 
generally HERBERT SHAPIRO, WHITE VIOLENCE AND BLACK RESPONSE: FROM 
RECONSTRUCTION TO MONTGOMERY (1988) (discussing the history of white racist violence and 
recounting black resistance to that violence); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The 
Second Amendment: Toward An Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 353-55 
(1991) (recounting incidents in which African Americans engaged in armed self-defense during 
the Jim Crow era). Many works of history mention incidents of armed self-defense by African 
Americans during the Jim Crow era, but no comprehensive treatment of the subject seems to exist.  
291. EMMETT J. SCOTT, NEGRO MIGRATION DURING THE WAR 97 (Arno Press 1969) (1920) 
(“Houses here are as a rule old, having been occupied by whites before they were turned over to 
negroes.”). 
292. Id. at 100. 
293. GROSSMAN, supra note 170, at 137 (discussing the expansion of the “black ghetto” 
starting in 1917); cf. THOMAS LEE PHILPOTT, THE SLUM AND THE GHETTO 117 (1978) 
(describing the growth of the black community in Chicago); SCOTT, supra note 291, at 104 (“The 
presence of negroes in an exclusively white locality usually brought forth loud protests and 
frequently ended in the abandonment of the block by whites.”). 
294. OSOFSKY, supra note 287, at 109-10. Buchanan had no direct effect on black migration 
to New York or Chicago because, at the time Buchanan was decided, no Northern city had a 
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hooligans faced less chance of conviction for engaging in violence against 
encroaching blacks, white homeowners in Atlanta295; Indianapolis; Norfolk; 
Richmond; New Orleans; Winston-Salem; Dallas; Charleston; and Dade 
County, Florida, felt sufficient pressure from expanding black populations 
to persuade their local governments to ignore Buchanan and pass residential 
segregation laws in the 1920s.296 
Klarman writes that “[i]n the Deep South, legal regulation was plainly 
unnecessary to maintain residential segregation. Blacks in cities such as 
Birmingham, Alabama, knew better than to enter white neighborhoods 
uninvited.”297 In fact, Birmingham considered and ultimately adopted a 
residential segregation ordinance.298 Even in the Deep South, then, 
residential segregation laws were apparently seen as an important means to 
restrict black settlement in white neighborhoods. 
 
residential segregation law. However, Klarman may go a bit too far when he states that 
segregation ordinances were “never seriously contemplated” in such cities. KLARMAN, supra note 
5, at 91. In 1917, the Chicago Real Estate Board—hardly a lightweight interest group—proposed 
a law segregating housing by race. PHILPOTT, supra note 293, at 164-65. The segregation proposal 
might have received serious consideration if Buchanan had upheld Louisville’s law. Id. at 164; 
William M. Tuttle, Jr., Contested Neighborhoods and Racial Violence: Prelude to the Chicago 
Riot of 1919, 55 J. NEGRO HIST. 266, 277 (1970). Indeed, even after Buchanan, agitation in 
Chicago for such laws continued, especially in the wake of the 1919 race riot. In 1919, for 
example, an alderman urged the city council to establish separate “residential zones for white 
people and colored people.” PHILPOTT, supra note 293, at 177.  
  But for Buchanan, it is not inconceivable that Chicago and other Northern cities would 
have enacted residential segregation laws. Klarman reports that “[n]orthern opinion was probably 
as supportive of residential segregation as was southern,” albeit less inclined, at least initially, to 
pursue this goal through legislation. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 143. As late as 1942, “84 percent 
of Americans—in the North as well as the South—favored residential segregation.” Id. at 191. 
Northern groups with an interest in stifling black migration to cities included white homeowners 
seeking to protect their property values, Democrats opposed to an influx of black Republicans, 
KUSMER, supra note 263, at 176, exclusionary labor unions fearful of black competition, 
HENDERSON H. DONALD, THE NEGRO MIGRATION OF 1916-1918, at 56 (1921) (discussing a 1917 
Philadelphia riot incited by labor unions against blacks), social Progressives eager to stifle 
interracial violence and limit the threat from blacks perceived as both inferior and potential 
economic competitors, MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE 
PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870-1920, at 182-93 (2003), and the Ku Klux Klan. 
295. Atlanta’s City Council enacted residential segregation laws in 1922, 1929, and 1931. 
Each of these was challenged on constitutional grounds and invalidated. RONALD H. BAYOR, 
RACE AND THE SHAPING OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY ATLANTA 55 (1996). If the only purpose for 
segregation laws was to impress white voters, with the laws themselves being essentially 
meaningless, the city council would almost certainly not have been this persistent. 
296. Silver, supra note 214, at 195-96. 
297. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 90. 
298. Birmingham considered residential segregation ordinances several times between 1900 
and 1920, rejecting the idea largely because of constitutional concerns. Carl V. Harris, Reforms in 
Government Control of Negroes in Birmingham, Alabama, 1890-1920, 38 J.S. HIST. 567, 571 n.10 
(1972) [LE:Check]. Pressure for segregation ordinances in Birmingham eventually grew 
sufficiently intense that, despite Buchanan, in 1925 Birmingham enacted a racial zoning 
ordinance “‘to restrict the negroes to certain districts.’” Silver, supra note 214, at 197. The city 
enacted one of the South’s last residential segregation ordinances in 1944, and it was invalidated 
in 1949. Monk v. City of Birmingham, 87 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Ala. 1949), aff’d, 185 F.2d 859 (5th 
Cir. 1950). 
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In short, Buchanan v. Warley required white homeowners and landlords 
seeking to exclude blacks from their neighborhoods to overcome major 
collective action problems and to internalize the costs of exclusion. As a 
result, whites were often unsuccessful in excluding blacks.299 As Fischel 
concludes, 
[I]t was, in the absence of apartheid laws like those at issue 
in Buchanan, very difficult to keep the black/white border 
from moving in ways adverse to whites. In fact, it must 
have been nearly impossible in most situations. We know 
this not from econometric studies about who paid what for 
housing, but from the simple demographic fact that the 
black ghetto took root and expanded in virtually every 
large city.300 
E. Why the Court Acted as It Did 
The mystery of why the Court suddenly became more protective of the 
rights of black Americans in the 1910s, despite increased racism in society 
as a whole, remains. One theory, propounded by Benno Schmidt, is that 
these decisions were “rooted in the institutional revival of the Supreme 
Court in the early part of the twentieth century, a revival which made its 
impact felt mainly in the aggressive tenets of laissez-faire constitutionalism, 
but which produced other, nobler and more lasting, if more tentative, 
constitutional legacies as well.”301 Yet one could more easily trace the rise 
in the Court’s assertiveness to 1895—one year before Plessy—when the 
Court ruled the federal income tax unconstitutional,302 limited the reach of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act by holding that manufacturing was not interstate 
commerce subject to federal regulation,303 and approved the use of the labor 
injunction by federal courts.304 
 
299. Beyond making it possible for blacks to move into white neighborhoods, Buchanan 
likely also benefited blacks who stayed in black neighborhoods. In the absence of segregation 
laws, self-interested whites who wanted to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods had an 
incentive to support more equitable public spending for African-American neighborhoods. 
Moreover, segregation laws would have allowed whites to impose the costs of segregation on 
blacks, as blacks would have had to pay exorbitant amounts for the restricted supply of housing in 
their assigned ghettos. Instead, when neighborhoods began to “turn over,” whites sold to blacks at 
bargain prices (though in some cases “blockbusting” realtors, black and white, were the prime 
beneficiaries of panic sales). Whites thus absorbed much of the cost of their own racism in the 
housing market, and blacks benefited. Bernstein, supra note 106, at 859-60. 
300. Fischel, supra note 286, at 979 (footnote omitted). 
301. 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 990. 
302. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
303. United States v. E.C. Knight Co. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
304. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). 
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Perhaps, however, the important shift in the early twentieth century was 
not the Court’s willingness in general to assert itself, but its newfound 
willingness to challenge the states’ assertions of their police powers. As late 
as 1888, the Court, over a lone dissent by Justice Field, upheld a 
Pennsylvania law that completely banned the sale of margarine, even 
though the law was obviously naked protectionist legislation for farmers 
with no plausible police power rationale.305 Even commentators who 
thought the Court should generally be deferential to state regulation 
criticized this decision.306 
The Court’s reluctance to challenge state assertions of police power 
soon ended. In 1905, a five-vote majority in Lochner v. New York boldly 
second-guessed New York’s claimed health rationale for a maximum hours 
law for bakers.307 The dissenting opinions acknowledged that the Court was 
obligated to second-guess a state’s assertion of its police powers in 
appropriate circumstances; the dispute was over who had the burden of 
proof, and how difficult it should be to meet that burden. 
While the aggressiveness of the Court’s Lochnerian jurisprudence 
ebbed and flowed for the next three decades, the Court’s role as the ultimate 
guarantor of the fundamental rights of American citizens against the states 
in a wide range of contexts is firmly traceable to Lochner.308 Blacks were 
hardly the sole beneficiaries of this shift in the Court’s institutional role 
(which, contrary to historical myth, was not limited to the realm of 
economic legislation).309 Consider that in the 1920s, the Court invalidated a 
law inspired by nativist hysteria that banned the teaching of foreign 
languages,310 an anti-Catholic law that sought to shut down private 
schools,311 and a law that attempted to prevent Japanese parents in Hawaii 
 
305. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888). 
306. See, e.g., ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS § 62, at 57 (1904) (“Even the danger to health or safety should not justify the absolute 
prohibition of a useful industry or practice [such as the manufacture of oleomargarine].”). 
307. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See generally David E. Bernstein, The Story of Lochner v. New 
York: Impediment to the Growth of the Regulatory State, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 325 
(Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004) (reviewing the history of the Lochner case). 
308. See Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, supra note 238. The potential for the Court’s 
robust self-assertion in Lochner to aid blacks was first shown in 1908 in Berea College v. 
Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908). The Berea College Court was faced with a Lochnerian challenge to 
a Kentucky law requiring that private universities be integrated, and with Kentucky’s reliance on 
Plessy and its broad view of the police power. See David E. Bernstein, Plessy Versus Lochner: 
The Berea College Case, 25 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 93 (2000). The Court was not yet ready to invalidate 
a segregation law. Rather than simply accede to Kentucky’s arguments, however, the Court 
resolved the case on nonconstitutional grounds. In doing so, the Court refused to apply Plessy to a 
new set of facts and gave civil rights activists hope that a future decision (like Buchanan) 
involving a challenge to coerced segregation in the private sector would be resolved in their favor. 
309. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, supra note 238, at 48-49.  
310. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
311. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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from sending their children to Japanese-language schools.312 All three 
opinions were written by the notoriously racist and anti-Semitic Justice 
McReynolds,313 a fact that perhaps makes his consistent votes to invalidate 
residential segregation laws seem less anomalous. 
While the ever-expanding edifice of Jim Crow “ran up against the 
fundamental American commitment to individual rights both in terms of 
physical and status mobility as a component of liberty and in terms of 
freedom of contract as a component of equality,”314 it was not inevitable 
that the Court’s increased willingness to challenge state assertions of the 
police power would manifest itself in increased protection for blacks. With 
American politics and society having grown increasingly racist, one might 
have expected the Court to have ignored blacks’ rights, even as it became 
generally more aggressive in reviewing state laws. 
The Supreme Court, however, is usually somewhat behind the times 
relative to changes in both popular and elite opinion on a given subject. Its 
members belong to an older cohort than both the median adult and the 
median influential intellectual and are likely to have experienced their 
formative intellectual influences in a bygone era. In modern times, the 
Court’s inherent conservatism has generally cut against its playing a leading 
role in recognizing and protecting the rights and interests of minority 
groups and women, as society has become increasingly sympathetic to 
these groups. 
 The Court’s inherent conservatism only cuts in favor of courts failing 
to protect minority rights from contemporary legislation when popular and 
elite opinion has recently become more favorable to minorities. During the 
Progressive Era popular and elite opinion were becoming increasingly 
hostile to blacks, with the result that the median Supreme Court Justice of 
the 1910s may very well have had comparatively liberal opinions regarding 
blacks, especially when it came to legal rights and disabilities. Additionally, 
the Justices’ relative insulation from popular pressures was apparent in 
Buchanan v. Warley. This insulation helps explain the Court’s decision in 
the face of racist hysteria aroused in many major cities by the sudden 
massive increase in black in-migration. 
The Court’s ability to act as a check on the increased de jure racism of 
the Progressive Era was enhanced by the enormous turnover on the Court 
starting in 1909.315 The generational shift was monumental, from Justices 
 
312. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927). 
313. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 132-35 (new & rev. ed. 
1999). 
314. WELKE, supra note 110, at 354. 
315. The five Justices whose terms ended between 1909 and 1912 were Harlan, Fuller, 
Brewer, Peckham, and Moody. Moody only served for four years, and he had replaced Justice 
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who grew up in an age when blacks were largely confined to chattel 
slavery,316 to those who became attorneys when basic rights for blacks were 
written into the Constitution and statutory law. One can speculate that the 
new generation of Supreme Court Justices, though hardly radical 
egalitarians, may very well have been disturbed by what they saw as the 
increasingly aggressive oppression of blacks in the 1910s.317 Similarly, 
libertarian and free-labor principles in which the new Justices were 
inevitably immersed during the laissez-faire Gilded Age may have 
counseled opposition to statist peonage and housing segregation laws that 
took away basic rights thought to be guaranteed to all individuals, blacks as 
well as whites.318 
 Moreover, unlike the more subtle Jim Crow laws of earlier decades, 
laws disfranchising blacks, relegating them to peonage, consigning them to 
unequal accommodations on common carriers, or limiting their ability to 
own and alienate property could easily have been seen as an explicit 
attempt by Southern legislatures to undermine federal law. The presence of 
the first Southern Democrat (Woodrow Wilson) in the White House since 
Andrew Johnson—and an overtly racist Southern Democrat at that—may 
have particularly inclined Northern Republicans on the Court to exhibit less 
deference to Southern sensibilities in McCabe than they had in Plessy. In 
the sixteen years prior to Wilson’s election the vast majority of Justices 
appointed were Northern Republicans, a group with no stake in supporting 
the Southern racism that Wilson represented. It hardly seems coincidental 
that five of the six Northern Republicans on the Court (save Holmes) voted 
to articulate a stringent standard of formal equality with respect to Southern 
 
Brown, author of Plessy. The new Justices were Lurton, Hughes, Lamar, Van Devanter, and 
Pitney. Lurton resigned in 1914 and was replaced by fellow Southerner James McReynolds. 
Lamar and Hughes resigned in 1916 and were replaced by Brandeis and Clarke. See JESSE H. 
CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1543-53 (9th ed. 2001). 
316. See MARK WARREN BAILEY, GUARDIANS OF THE MORAL ORDER: THE LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1860-1910, at 215-16 (2004) (noting that all of the 
Supreme Court Justices appointed through 1895 were educated or trained before the Civil War). 
317. In the absence of direct evidence of why the Justices voted a particular way in a 
particular case, a certain amount of informed speculation is inevitable, and Klarman’s own claims 
regarding why Court doctrine shifted over time rely quite a bit on speculation. See generally 
Garrow, supra note 7, at 699 (reviewing Klarman and noting his reliance on “well-educated 
guesswork”). 
318. Both of these factors are apparent in Justice Hughes’s opinion in Bailey [ME: 
formatting?]: 
Without imputing any actual motive to oppress, we must consider the natural 
operation of the statute here in question, and it is apparent that it furnishes a 
convenient instrument for the coercion which the Constitution and the act of 
Congress forbid; an instrument of compulsion peculiarly effective as against 
the poor and the ignorant, its most likely victims. There is no more important 
concern than to safeguard the freedom of labor upon which alone can 
enduring prosperity be based.  
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 244-45 (1911) (citation omitted). 
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segregation in McCabe, while all three Southerners on the Court declined to 
join the opinion. Like earlier state and local discrimination against the 
Chinese,319 the Jim Crow policies that came before the Progressive Era 
Court may have raised nationalist hackles. Given that these laws directly 
challenged the Fifteenth Amendment (Guinn and Myers), the Thirteenth 
Amendment and the Peonage Act (Bailey and Reynolds), the federal 
commitment to formal equality (McCabe), and the federal commitment to 
blacks’ property and contract rights reflected in the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (Buchanan), the Justices may have 
implicitly sought to defend federal power against recalcitrant states and 
localities.320 
F. The Impact of the Progressive Era Cases 
The fact that constitutional law changed in a favorable direction for 
blacks in the 1910s does not answer the question posed by Klarman—
whether “the justices possess a significant capacity to defend minority 
rights from majority oppression.”321 The answer depends on what one 
means by “significant capacity.”322 
The Progressive Era Court was most effective in aiding blacks where its 
decisions invalidated laws needed to create a government-enforced cartel 
among private-sector actors who had collective action or cost 
externalization reasons to defect from voluntary commitments to “do their 
part.” Southern planters, for example, preferred to cooperate to stifle black 
mobility and wage growth,323 but Bailey’s invalidation of peonage laws 
seems to have accelerated a decline in coercive labor practices.324 The result 
was an increase in black mobility. This, in turn, created market incentives 
 
319. See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text. 
320. See 9 BICKEL & SCHMIDT, supra note 103, at 987 (attributing the outcome of the 
Progressive-era race cases in part to a rising sense of nationalism among the Justices, especially 
Chief Justice White). See generally LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 50 
(1994) (contending that “the competence, perspective, and institutional location and structure of 
the federal courts” makes them more likely than state courts to give a generous reading to federal 
constitutional rights (emphasis omitted)); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 
1105 (1977) (arguing that federal courts are institutionally more likely to protect federal 
constitutional rights from hostile local majoritarian sentiment than are state courts). 
321. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 62. 
322. With regard to the Chinese, for example, the courts were hardly capable or willing to 
undermine all anti-Chinese legislation—Congress halted the immigration of Chinese laborers in 
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, and did repeal that Act and permit 
foreign-born Chinese to become citizens until 1943. Act of Dec. 17, 1943, Pub L. No. 78-199, 57 
Stat. 600. Moreover, in the absence of relevant federal legislation, the Court could do nothing 
about the widespread discrimination and hostility the Chinese faced from private actors. 
323. See sources cited supra note 81. 
324. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
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among planters to raise blacks’ wages, both in competition with each other 
and to discourage black migration to urban areas.325 Buchanan could not 
force whites to live in the same neighborhoods as blacks, but it did prevent 
cities from stifling black migration by creating de jure and inflexible 
boundaries for black neighborhoods, and may have prevented even more 
damaging legislation. 
Also, the effectiveness of judicial decisions in protecting a minority 
group depends on the legal, economic, and political resources the minority 
group has to act on those decisions. Blacks in the 1910s had few such 
resources. There is obviously an element of fortuity in such matters; if a 
philanthropist had provided the NAACP with a huge grant in the late 
1910s326 or the racially liberal Harding Administration had lasted two terms 
instead of two scandal-plagued years, the Court’s Progressive Era race 
decisions would likely have had a greater and more immediate positive 
impact.327 
IV. BROWN AND BACKLASH 
Brown v. Board of Education is arguably the most widely discussed 
decision in the history of the United States Supreme Court. Klarman’s 
detailed and insightful analysis of the case is an enormous contribution to 
an already extensive literature. Because previous reviewers have already 
discussed this part of the book in great detail,328 we limit our focus here to 
two major points that earlier reviewers, Klarman himself, and the previous 
literature on Brown have largely neglected. 
 Klarman claims that Brown had little or no direct impact on school 
segregation, but argues that it had a major indirect impact by stimulating a 
huge white backlash—the notorious “massive resistance” to the 
implementation of Brown. According to Klarman, this backlash induced a 
Northern white counterbacklash that led to the passage of the Civil Rights 
 
325. See supra notes 116-122 and accompanying text. 
326. Unlike blacks in the 1910s, the Chinese in the late nineteenth century were well 
organized and had well-funded organizations that allowed them to use favorable court decisions to 
their significant advantage. See generally MCCLAIN, supra note 128 (detailing various litigation 
engaged in by the Chinese). 
327. In thinking about what might have been, consider that President Harding stunned a 
white audience in Birmingham in October 1921 by announcing that “I would say let the black 
man vote when he is fit to vote; prohibit the white man from voting when he is unfit to vote” and 
“I would insist upon equal educational opportunity [for whites and blacks].” DEAN, supra note 
165, at 125-26 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
328. See sources cited supra note 7. 
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Act of 1964, the legislation that—unlike judicial intervention—finally 
succeeded in desegregating most Southern schools.329 
We emphasize two major reservations about Klarman’s thesis. First, 
Klarman, like other scholars who minimize Brown’s impact,330 largely 
ignores the fact that the mere anticipation of a Brown-like decision led 
several Southern states to enact massive increases in funding for black 
schools in an attempt to persuade the Court to forgo ordering full 
desegregation. Second, Klarman’s backlash thesis raises an important 
question that he does not sufficiently address: If Brown was as ineffective 
in promoting integration as he claims, why did Southern whites find it 
necessary to launch a costly campaign of massive resistance to counter it? It 
is possible that massive resistance was simply a result of widespread 
ignorance among white Southern voters who—egged on by ambitious 
politicians—overestimated the threat posed by Brown to their cherished 
institutions.331 But there is also considerable evidence suggesting that 
massive resistance was in fact necessary for segregationists to be able to 
contain Brown’s impact. If this is true, and Southern racists were properly 
afraid of Brown’s effect despite the obvious barriers to implementation 
facing the Court, it implies that judicial power can be considerably more 
formidable than Klarman and other skeptics suggest. 
Klarman not only argues that Brown failed to achieve any substantial 
desegregation, but also suggests that massive resistance was not needed to 
prevent it from doing so. He contends that “massive resistance almost 
certainly proved a mistake” from the perspective of segregationists, and that 
 
329. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 362-64. By 1964, after ten years of judicial action, only one 
percent of black schoolchildren in the Deep South attended integrated schools. Id. at 362-63. 
330. See sources cited supra note 4 (including Rosenberg’s otherwise very thorough 
analysis). 
331. The possibility that political ignorance played a key role in stimulating massive 
resistance deserves more detailed analysis than we can give it here. Researchers have found that 
most citizens have little knowledge and understanding of politics and public policy. See Ilya 
Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the 
Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1304-13 (2004) 
(summarizing the evidence). Public knowledge concerning the judiciary is even lower than that of 
other political institutions. See, e.g., id. at 1308 tbl.1 (presenting survey data showing that in 2000 
only eleven percent of Americans could identify the post held by William Rehnquist, in contrast 
to greater familiarity with other public officials). Several studies of public familiarity with the 
Supreme Court conducted during the heyday of the Warren Court in the 1960s show that only a 
minority of Americans knew anything about recent Court decisions. See ROSENBERG, supra note 
4, at 125-26 (citing studies). Moreover, political knowledge in the South has historically been 
lower than in other parts of the country. See, e.g., MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, 
WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 145, 183 (1996) (showing 
that Southerners have lower political knowledge than residents of other regions even when 
controlling for other variables); Ilya Somin, Voter Knowledge and Constitutional Change: 
Assessing the New Deal Experience, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 595, 631-34, tbls. 2-5 (2003) 
(showing that Southerners had lower political knowledge levels in surveys conducted in 1952, just 
before Brown). 
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more modest “tried-and-true evasive techniques” would probably have 
better achieved their goals.332 But elsewhere in the book, Klarman argues 
that the Supreme Court may have held back on implementing desegregation 
for fear of massive resistance.333 Based on this, it could be argued that 
massive resistance was a necessary element of segregationist strategy 
despite the risks involved. 
Either interpretation of Brown’s impact raises serious questions for 
Klarman’s broader argument that the federal judiciary had little ability to 
protect black civil rights against Jim Crow. If massive resistance was 
necessary to prevent Brown from having a major effect, this suggests that 
the Supreme Court was far less toothless than Klarman acknowledges. This 
point is especially significant given that massive resistance began to break 
down even before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reinforced judicial 
intervention with federal legislative and executive efforts. As Klarman 
shows, massive resistance was too costly to Southern whites to persist 
indefinitely, and federal court decisions began to have a substantial impact 
on school desegregation once resistance began to collapse in the early 
1960s. If, on the other hand, massive resistance was not necessary to 
prevent Brown from having an impact, then we must consider why it 
nonetheless occurred. 
A. Brown’s Neglected Anticipatory Impact 
Klarman and other Brown skeptics have almost completely ignored the 
striking fact that the case had a major positive impact on the education of 
Southern blacks even before it was decided. As Klarman recognizes, 
several Southern states, including staunchly segregationist South Carolina 
and Mississippi, adopted “crash equalization programs that promised rapid 
redress of educational inequalities in black schools.”334 Klarman 
acknowledges in passing that these measures were in part “a response . . . to 
the threat of desegregation litigation,”335 but fails to consider the 
implications of this fact for his broader theory of judicial power. This 
evidence conflicts with the revisionist claim that seeking social justice 
through litigation is a purely “hollow hope.”336 At the very least, the Brown 
litigation was bound to cause a massive increase in spending on the public 
schools most blacks attended. 
 
332. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 462. 
333. Id. at 333-34. 
334. Id. at 311. 
335. Id. at 189. 
336. The title of Gerald Rosenberg’s well-known book. ROSENBERG, supra note 4. 
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In South Carolina in 1951, Governor James Byrnes persuaded the state 
legislature to pass a massive $75 million education spending package which 
he said was intended to “provide for the races substantial equality in school 
facilities.”337 His school equalization legislation was closely coordinated 
with South Carolina’s legal strategy in the ongoing case of Briggs v. Elliott, 
the South Carolina school desegregation case that eventually became one of 
five desegregation cases consolidated into Brown.338 Moreover, it is 
important to note that Byrnes not only promised an increase in spending, 
but actually implemented it. Spending on black schools in South Carolina 
and some other states “rose greatly between 1950 and 1954,” the period 
during which Brown and related cases were making their way to the 
Supreme Court.339  
An almost equally large school equalization spending program was 
adopted by Mississippi.340 Despite many shortcomings, the program did 
increase spending on black schools and raise the salaries of black teachers 
from thirty-nine percent of white salaries in 1950 to fifty-six percent in 
1953-1954.341 Like South Carolina’s program, Mississippi’s was adopted 
for the explicit purpose of heading off a federal court decision ordering 
desegregation.342 Both programs represented a major departure from earlier 
policies. 
Although this Review is by no means the only scholarly work to 
discuss these events, their implications for debates about Brown and 
judicial power have not been appreciated either by Klarman or his 
predecessors. The South Carolina and Mississippi programs, as well as 
similar though smaller efforts in other states,343 were clearly caused by fear 
of federal judicial intervention rather than by autonomous political or social 
forces within the affected states themselves. While Byrnes was a relatively 
moderate segregationist who “opposed the more blatant forms of white 
 
337. KLUGER, supra note 114, at 334 (quoting Byrnes’s 1951 inaugural address). For further 
details of Byrnes’s program, see DAVID ROBERTSON, SLY AND ABLE: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 
OF JAMES F. BYRNES 507-10 (1994). 
338. For a detailed description of the links between Byrnes’s legislative agenda and his 
litigation strategy, see ROBERTSON, supra note 337, at 507-25. See also KLUGER, supra note 114, 
at 334-35 (noting coordination between Byrnes’s education reforms and South Carolina’s strategy 
in the Briggs case). 
339. JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE 
AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 38 (2001). 
340. Charles C. Bolton, Mississippi’s School Equalization Program, 1945-1954: “A Last 
Gasp To Try To Maintain a Segregated Educational System,” 66 J.S. HIST. 781 (2000). 
341. See Bolton, supra note 340, at 797, 804. 
342. Id. at 785-86 (noting that “white Mississippians who began to call for greater 
equalization between white and black public schools generally made sure to emphasize that their 
ultimate motive remained preserving white privileges and saving school segregation”). 
343. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 311; see also Bolton, supra note 340, at 782 (noting that 
Southern states “all began or enhanced programs to improve black education” in the years 
immediately following World War II). 
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repression” of blacks,344 the timing of his school equalization program, its 
close coordination with the state’s litigation strategy in Brown, and 
Byrnes’s own private explanations of his motives345 make it clear that 
staving off federal judicial involvement was his primary objective. 
As for Mississippi, the South’s poorest and most vehemently racist 
state346 would not have undertaken large expenditures intended to reduce 
the massive inequalities between black and white schools on its own 
independent initiative. Thus, it is clear that the mere threat of a Brown 
decision had a large and beneficial impact on Southern black education as 
much as several years before the Supreme Court actually reached its 
decision. In this context, Derrick Bell’s well-known argument that the 
Brown Court should have given up on desegregation and instead required 
state governments to fairly implement Plessy-style “separate but equal” 
schooling seems unintentionally ironic.347 It was precisely the threat of 
desegregation that at long last made possible even partial realization of the 
promise of “equality” under the “separate but equal” standard. Obviously, 
the funding equalization programs instituted by several Southern states 
could not and did not eliminate the inequality inherent in Jim Crow 
segregated education.348 They did, however, mark a significant 
improvement over the prior status quo. 
There is an even more important implication of the equalization 
programs for the debate over Brown’s efficacy. Klarman, Rosenberg, Bell, 
and other critics have repeatedly argued that Brown was largely ineffective 
in stimulating desegregation. Yet James Byrnes and other segregationist 
political leaders clearly were not so sanguine as they contemplated the 
prospect of a pro-integration decision by the Supreme Court. Had they 
expected such a decision to be ineffective, they would not have tried to 
head it off by allocating vast public expenditures for the benefit of blacks, 
most of whom still lacked the vote or any other form of political power. 
Rather, these politicians probably would have preferred to spend the money 
on white constituencies that could help them win reelection. The belief of 
Byrnes and other Southern leaders that a Supreme Court decision in favor 
of school integration would have significant consequences—and even more 
so their willingness to back that belief with large public expenditures that 
 
344. KLUGER, supra note 114, at 334; see PATTERSON, supra note 339, at 38. 
345. ROBERTSON, supra note 337, at 507-10. 
346. On Mississippi’s extreme poverty and commitment to racism and segregation at this 
time, see KEY, supra note 93, at 229-30. 
347. BELL, supra note 4. For a similar argument by a leading scholar who nonetheless 
supports the holding in Brown, see MARK TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST 
SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-50, at 158-62 (1987). 
348. See, e.g., Bolton, supra note 340, at 793-806 (discussing serious flaws of Mississippi’s 
equalization programs). 
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otherwise could have been spent on politically powerful white interests 
rather than powerless blacks—should give pause to scholars who claim that 
the Court had little ability to force Southern states to integrate. 
The equalization programs provide further support for the cost-
minimization theory of judicial impact.349 Obviously, equalization was a 
much more expensive way to maintain segregation than the previous policy 
of simply assigning blacks to grossly inferior schools without making any 
effort at all to make them equal to white schools. It is also significant that 
white political leaders were willing to pay these costs in order to avoid the 
even greater costs (from their point of view) that were likely to be imposed 
by a Supreme Court decision mandating integration. 
Southern leaders’ expectations of the likely effects of federal court 
decisions on desegregation is a critical issue that we can only scratch the 
surface of here. Our analysis cannot be considered definitive, but it does 
cast serious new doubt on the claim that Brown had little direct impact. 
B. Why the Backlash to Brown? 
1. The Puzzle of Massive Resistance to an Ineffective Decision 
If, nonetheless, we assume that Klarman and other revisionist scholars 
are right to claim that Brown could not and did not have a significant effect 
on Southern school segregation, we must ask why Southern states mounted 
such an immense backlash against it. Why was there massive resistance to 
an empty threat? 
Klarman argues that massive resistance was fueled by three factors that 
“radicalized southern politics” in a way that earlier court decisions had 
not:350 [ME: formatting?] 
 
1. Brown was “harder to ignore than earlier changes” because of 
extensive press coverage of the decision.351  
 
2. “Brown represented federal interference in southern race relations—
something that white southerners . . . could not tolerate.”352  
 
3. “Brown commanded that racial change take place in a different order 
than might otherwise have occurred. . . . White southerners were more 
 
349. See supra Sections II.B-C. 
350. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 391. 
351. Id. 
352. Id. 
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intensely committed to preserving school segregation, which lay near the 
top of the white supremacist hierarchy of preferences.”353 
  
These three explanations are significant, but they cannot explain the 
massive scale of Southern backlash if we assume that Brown was not likely 
to have any real impact on Southern school segregation. 
With regard to press coverage, it is not clear why extensive press 
coverage of Brown would necessarily lead to a massive backlash against a 
decision that was not having any significant effect. Indeed, one might 
expect that extensive press coverage would actually calm white fears as 
news of the decision’s ineffectiveness spread more quickly than it might 
have otherwise. Furthermore, Klarman presents little evidence to support 
his claim that Brown received massive press coverage,354 and neglects 
extensive data assembled by Gerald Rosenberg indicating that mid-1950s 
press attention to Brown and other civil rights issues was comparatively 
modest.355 
Klarman is certainly right to claim that Brown represented an effort at 
federal interference in Southern race relations. But the same could be said 
of virtually every other pro-civil rights decision issued by the federal courts. 
Yet only Brown stimulated such enormous resistance, a puzzling result if 
the decision was toothless. 
Klarman is also right to note that Southern whites were particularly 
sensitive on the issue of school integration. Even so, it is difficult to 
understand why they would generate such an enormous backlash against a 
decision that was not actually causing any integration to occur. At the very 
least, one would have expected the uproar to have quickly died down as 
Brown’s ineffectiveness became more evident to Southern whites. In 
reality, as Klarman documents, the scale and vehemence of massive 
resistance actually increased during the first several years following 
Brown.356 
In sum, Klarman fails to resolve the tension between the claim that 
Brown was not (and could not have been) effective in promoting school 
integration, and the undeniable fact that it generated a massive and 
unprecedented white political backlash. Klarman concludes that massive 
 
353. Id. 
354. The evidence cited consists of the assertion that Brown “received front-page coverage in 
virtually every newspaper in the country” and quotes from two sources—a Northern visitor to the 
South and a segregationist political activist.[LE: check] Id. It is surely true that Brown made the 
front page, but that is very different than saying that it led to a lasting increase in press attention to 
civil rights matters. 
355. See ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 111-16 (citing extensive evidence and numerous 
studies indicating limited press attention to civil rights matters in the years immediately following 
Brown). 
356. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 393-400. 
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resistance was probably an irrational strategy because it “abandoned the 
tried-and-true evasive techniques that for decades had successfully nullified 
the constitutional rights of blacks, in favor of outright defiance.”357 
Segregationist strategists would have been more successful in escaping the 
wrath of Northern whites if they had “eschewed” the use of violence and 
“vigilante mobs” to block “desegregation orders” and instead used 
inconspicuous “fraudulent mechanisms to circumvent school 
desegregation.”358 Yet it strains credulity to believe that the vast majority of 
political leaders and activists across most of the white South were simply 
irrational or bullheaded. A more plausible alternative explanation for 
massive resistance is that Brown was not as toothless as Klarman suggests. 
Massive resistance may in fact have been the only available means to 
neutralize Brown’s impact, albeit at the cost of eventually provoking even 
greater federal intervention. 
3. Was Massive Resistance Needed To Prevent Brown from Having a 
Greater Impact? 
 A. Evidence That Massive Resistance Was Necessary To Block Brown 
There are several pieces of evidence suggesting that only massive 
resistance was capable of severely constricting Brown’s immediate impact. 
While none are definitive in and of themselves, their cumulative impact 
seriously undermines the argument that less radical forms of resistance 
would have more effectively maintained segregation. First, Klarman’s 
excellent account of the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking implies that 
massive-resistance advocates were right to believe that drastic threats of 
violence and school closures played a decisive role in blocking 
implementation of Brown. In their deliberations over Brown II,359 the key 
case determining guidelines for implementing the original Brown decision, 
Klarman demonstrates that the Justices decided to adopt the notoriously 
gradualist “all deliberate speed” formula in large part out of fear of 
violence.360 [LE: check] As Klarman points out, this decision broke with 
prior practice in civil rights cases—including cases desegregating higher 
education—where the rule had been that constitutional rights must be 
 
357. Id. at 462. 
358. Id. Klarman uses North Carolina as an example of such subtle resistance to Brown, one 
that could have been a model for other states. Id.  
359. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
360. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 314-16. 
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implemented immediately.361 While we cannot know for certain that the 
Court would have insisted on swifter implementation in the absence of 
threats of violence and school closures, such a step would have been 
consistent with prior practice and with the Justices’ belief that segregation 
in education was morally abhorrent.362 At the very least, the fact that 
massive resistance played a major role in the Justices’ calculations suggests 
that they might have acted differently in its absence. 
A second source of evidence indicating that massive resistance may 
have been necessary to stymie the enforcement of Brown was the 
experience of the border states, where state governments did not engage in 
major resistance to Brown. As a result, Brown greatly reduced school 
segregation in these states long before the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Even 
Rosenberg, the most thoroughgoing of academic Brown skeptics, concedes 
that “[t]he Supreme Court appears to have had an important impact on 
school desegregation in the six border states and the District of 
Columbia.”363 Klarman too, acknowledges that Brown was successful in 
desegregating the border states, though he also notes—correctly—that 
significant pockets of segregation remained.364 
 Rosenberg concludes that Brown was effective in the border states 
because “there was little in the way of large-scale, hard-core 
opposition”365—precisely the kind of opposition that, further south, was 
supplied by the forces of massive resistance. From a cost-minimization 
standpoint, border-state whites, because of their lesser commitment to Jim 
Crow, were more price sensitive than those in the Deep South. When the 
price of maintaining school segregation was raised by Brown, border-state 
whites were unwilling to pay it by adopting a strategy of massive 
resistance. 
A third piece of evidence is drawn from Klarman’s account of the 
demise of massive resistance in the Deep South in the early 1960s.366 
Massive resistance collapsed because Southern whites began to find 
constant violence and school closings too great a price to bear.367 White 
 
361. Id. at 314. 
362. See id. at 292-312.  
363. ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 50. While only about one percent of Southern black 
schoolchildren were attending integrated schools as late as 1964, in the border states almost fifty-
five percent were doing so. Id. 
364. KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 346-48. 
365. Id. at 104. 
366. Id. at 417-20. 
367. Id. White Southern leaders themselves noted that massive resistance had collapsed 
because its cost was too great. As segregationist Virginia Governor J. Lindsay Almond put it in 
1962, “[T]he only way to defeat integration was to close down every single, solitary school in this 
state, and keep them closed.” JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CRISIS OF CONSERVATIVE VIRGINIA: THE 
BYRD MACHINE AND THE POLITICS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE 126 (1976). 
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business leaders in particular began to oppose massive resistance because 
they “dreaded the economic impact of closed schools.”368 As a result, they 
were forced to switch to less aggressive tactics, such as admitting “token” 
numbers of black students while trying to use administrative machinery to 
keep out the rest.369 The collapse of massive resistance led to a substantial 
increase in the pace of desegregation in 1962-1963, prior to the passage of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.370 In the fall of 1963, 161 school districts 
desegregated, “by far the largest number since 1956.”371 We cannot know 
how fast desegregation would have proceeded had the Civil Rights Act not 
been adopted and the judiciary been forced to continue to battle school 
segregation largely on its own. However, as Klarman notes, it is clear that 
the collapse of massive resistance “had increased the pace of 
desegregation.”372 
B. Why Evasion Might Not Have Been Enough 
If massive resistance was needed to stop Brown from having a major 
impact, this raises the question of why the subtle evasion tactics that 
Klarman suggests Southern states might have adopted instead were not 
sufficient. Obviously, we cannot know for sure what would have happened 
had Southern state governments abjured massive resistance from the very 
beginning and instead concentrated on more moderate tactics of evasion. 
Although historians are more receptive to counterfactuals than they have 
been in the past,373 counterfactual analysis remains an inexact science at 
best. Nonetheless, we tentatively suggest two reasons that subtle evasive 
tactics would not have been effective: greater transparency of school policy 
as compared to some other aspects of Jim Crow and a lower judicial 
tolerance for subterfuge caused by the changing composition of the federal 
judiciary. 
Unlike in the areas of criminal procedure and voting registration, where 
subtle evasion had been highly effective, discrimination in school 
enrollment was comparatively more transparent. In criminal procedure, for 
example, courts could relatively easily detect and reverse flagrant cases 
where defendants were almost literally railroaded to conviction, but could 
not readily ferret out more subtle forms of discrimination against black 
 
368. NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE NEW SOUTH, 1945-1980, at 245 (1995). 
369. Id. at 417-19. 
370.  KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 361-63. 
371. Id. at 362. 
372. Id. at 363. 
373. See, e.g., VIRTUAL HISTORY: ALTERNATIVES AND COUNTERFACTUALS (Niall Ferguson 
ed., 1997) (presenting analysis of a range of counterfactual scenarios by leading historians). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
BERNSTEIN-SOMIN DRAFT FOR OFFICER PROOF 11/5/2004  3:32 PM 
164 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. nn:nnn 
 
defendants and potential jurors.374 Similarly, in a context where Supreme 
Court decisions affirmed the legality of literacy tests, poll taxes, and other 
facially race-neutral methods of excluding voters, it was very difficult for 
courts to tell whether local registrars—who generally had broad 
discretionary authority—were implementing these policies in a 
discriminatory way in any given case.375 By contrast, the ongoing exclusion 
of all or nearly all black schoolchildren from white schools located in close 
geographic proximity to them could not easily be hidden or explained away 
in the face of even mildly skeptical judicial scrutiny.376  
Despite the relative transparency of school segregation, there were 
probably enough subterfuges available to Southern authorities that federal 
lower courts could have found grounds for ignoring persistent segregation 
had they been strongly inclined to do so. A vital element of the 
desegregation story was therefore the refusal of numerous lower court 
judges to accept excuses and subterfuges. In particular, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, which at that time covered most of the Deep South, 
invalidated a wide range of efforts to get around desegregation 
requirements and eventually imposed detailed integration requirements on 
recalcitrant school officials.377 
A key factor in the Fifth Circuit’s reluctance to endorse Southern state 
governments’ efforts at obstructionism as much as its predecessors had 
done was the court’s composition. Five of the circuit’s judges were 
 
374. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 5, at 274-83. 
375. See KEY, supra note 93, at 560-76 (showing how discriminatory exclusion of black 
voters was usually accomplished by the exercise of discretionary authority at the local level). 
376. Obviously, a much different situation arose in later cases, where school segregation 
existed as a consequence of housing segregation rather than as a result of discriminatory 
assignment of students to segregated schools far from their homes. See, e.g., DAVID J. ARMOR, 
FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW (1995) (describing and criticizing 
judicial decisions using forced busing of students as a remedy for school segregation caused by 
housing segregation). In the Jim Crow-era South of the 1950s and 1960s, however, the main focus 
of reform efforts was on the more blatant discrimination embodied in state efforts to force black 
students to attend more distant segregated schools even in situations where white schools were 
located nearby. 
377. The best known of the Fifth Circuit decisions striking down subterfuges was United 
States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967) (en banc) (per 
curiam), which struck down a “freedom of choice” plan and imposed detailed integration 
guidelines on school officials. But the Fifth Circuit had cracked down on various subterfuges well 
before then. Between 1955 and 1960, federal judges in the South held over 200 hearings on the 
subject of school desegregation, most of them involving state efforts to impede school integration. 
PATTERSON, supra note 339, at 96. [LE: check] For detailed accounts of the Fifth Circuit’s role, 
see HARVEY C. COUCH, A HISTORY OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, 1891-1981 (1984); J.W. PELTASON, 
FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961); 
J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL 
INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 90-91, 111-14 (1979); Jack Bass, The Fifth Circuit in Southern 
History, 19 GA. L. REV. 473 (1985). 
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appointed by President Eisenhower in the 1950s.378 Three of the five 
Eisenhower nominees—John Minor Wisdom, Elbert Tuttle, and John 
Brown—“became prominent supporters of desegregation” on the bench.379 
Wisdom in particular became highly influential as the leader of 
desegregation efforts in the lower courts.380 
The emergence of Eisenhower appointees as champions of 
desegregation was not accidental. Although Eisenhower himself was at best 
lukewarm with respect to Brown,381 his Justice Department was staffed by 
Republicans from the “Party’s eastern liberal wing” supportive of 
desegregation.382 In choosing judicial nominees for Southern federal courts, 
they sought to pick integrationists and, at the very least, exclude strong 
supporters of segregation.383 Perhaps even more importantly, Eisenhower’s 
main goal in selecting judges was to ensure the selection of as many 
Republicans as possible in order to rectify the “acute political imbalance” in 
the federal judiciary brought about by twenty years of Democratic control 
of the nomination process.384 In the Democrat-dominated South of the 
1950s, the Republican Party had for a long time been more receptive to 
desegregration than had the Democrats. Thus, the policy of appointing 
Republican judges led to the creation of a federal judiciary more 
sympathetic to integration and less willing to permit evasions of Brown 
than would otherwise have been the case. This is a striking example of how 
political imperatives unrelated to race might nonetheless lead to the 
selection of judges who disproportionately come from groups relatively 
sympathetic to civil rights enforcement.385 While not all of Eisenhower’s 
Southern judicial appointees supported desegregation,386 the combination of 
the President’s partisan objectives and his Justice Department’s 
 
378. Data calculated from Federal Judicial Center, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2004); see also SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT 
SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 129 (1997). Eisenhower also appointed three judges to 
the Fourth Circuit, which included much of the Upper South. [LE: cite] 
379. GOLDMAN, supra note 378, at 129. 
380. For a recent account of Wisdom’s impact, see Joel Wm. Friedman, The Emergence of 
John Minor Wisdom as Intellectual Leader of the Fifth Circuit: Reflecting Back on the Forty-Fifth 
Anniversary of His Joining the Court, 77 TUL. L. REV. 915 (2003). 
381. Eisenhower privately stated, “I personally think the decision was wrong.” ARTHUR 
LARSON, EISENHOWER: THE PRESIDENT NOBODY KNEW 124 (1968) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Publicly, he expressed support for judicial enforcement of the decision, without publicly 
commenting on whether the Supreme Court’s reasoning was correct or not. GOLDMAN, supra note 
378, at 127. 
382. GOLDMAN, supra note 378, at 127. 
383. Id. at 127-30. 
384. Id. at 112, 112-13. [LE: check] 
385. See supra Subsection II.E.3. 
386. See, e.g., GOLDMAN, supra note 378, at 129 (noting that one of Eisenhower’s appointees 
to the Fifth Circuit was an “ultra segregationist”). 
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integrationist sympathies ensured that the new judges were, on average, 
much more liberal on racial issues than those they replaced.387 
 
C. Cost Minimization and Brown’s Impact 
 
Although Brown failed to achieve immediate desegregation in the 
South of the kind that was accomplished in the border states, it did greatly 
increase the cost of maintaining school segregation. By the early 1960s, 
most Southern whites were no longer willing to go on paying it.388 The cost 
minimization hypothesis is thus supported by the evidence: Brown 
promoted school desegregation by greatly increasing the costs of preventing 
it. While the Court certainly was not the omnipotent force for good of 
traditional Brown hagiography, Klarman’s own meticulous research 
suggests that he understates its effectiveness. 
CONCLUSION 
From Jim Crow to Civil Rights is an outstanding contribution to the 
literature on both civil rights law and judicial power more generally. The 
book should be, and likely will be, at the forefront of debate over these 
topics for the foreseeable future. Future research on the Supreme Court’s 
role in American society should emulate Klarman’s emphasis on the 
importance of social context for constitutional law and supplement it with 
equally rigorous attention to collective action problems, cost 
externalization, cost minimization, and other factors that can augment the 
impact of judicial decisions invalidating laws. As Klarman persuasively 
demonstrates, judicial power is no panacea for the troubles of the 
oppressed. Judges lack the capacity to comprehensively uproot and reform 
entrenched social systems. But there is also much evidence, some of it 
provided by Klarman himself, that judicial power can do more for 
oppressed minorities than today’s skeptics are willing to admit. 
 
387. For evidence of the major changes wrought by Eisenhower’s lower court appointees, see 
sources cited supra note 377. 
388. See supra notes 366-369 and accompanying text. 
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